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HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES
PACIFIC OCEAN AREAS
APO 958

INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

No 11 - 9 Mar 45

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NOTE: Material in this Bulletin which is based on PW interrogations should be appraised accordingly.

COVER PAGE:- Trip wire installation between gun emplacements near the beach, south of the MARABANG River, LEYTE.

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Puppet Forces in Manchukuo and China

(From WD, MID, Washington D.C. JOB Bulletin No 103, 7 Feb 45)

THE MANCHUKUOAN ARMY:

History and Organization:- The Manchukuoan Army was created under Japanese guidance after 18 Sept 31. It is operated and controlled by a Department of Defense which functions as one of the major government departments under the Emperor of MANCHUKUO, who is believed to be the commander-in-Chief of the Army. Actually, under the fiction of cooperating with MANCHUKUO in the maintenance of national security under the provisions of the protocol of 14 Sept 32, the commander of the Kwantung Army is the real commander of the Manchukuoan Army.

The General Staff Bureau, headed by a Chief of Staff, has charge of general affairs, military operations, recruiting and training of troops organization of the Army, and medical and judicial affairs. It is composed of general staff officers with Japanese Army officers as advisors. A Japanese major general on the active list, with the title of Chief Military Advisor to the Manchukuoan General Staff, controls and directs all Japanese personnel on duty with the Manchukuoan Army as advisors and instructors.

The Army was reorganized sometime between 1933 and 1935 and divided into six Military Affairs Districts, each under the command of a general who had shown himself to be thoroughly in sympathy with the Japanese Kwantung Army. In 1941, the number of districts was increased to seven and in 1943 to nine. The boundaries of these districts follow provincial lines.

Although all of the major identified units are probably subordinated to a Military Affairs District, no effort is made to indicate subordination.

The Army seems to include all the components of modern armed force. Two infantry divisions and one cavalry division have been identified, but the normal tactical unit is the brigade, composed of two regiments. Roughly half the combat units are infantry and half cavalry.

Recruiting and training:- Both conscription and preliminary training are carried on through the system of Military Affairs Districts. The Kwantung Army supervises the Districts with respect to the training and tactical use of the Manchukuoan Army. It is assumed (lacking evidence of the existence of any other organization), that the Military Affairs Districts control the conscription of both Japanese Nationals, destined for use in the Japanese Army, and Manchukuoan Nationals, destined for the Manchukuoan Army. The Japanese Ambassador to MANCHUKUO, through representatives in each Military Affairs District, controls the administrative matters of registration, conscription and induction of Japanese Nationals for the Japanese Army.

The Military Affairs Districts may embrace more than one province but each province constitutes a separate conscription area. In addition, HSINKING City and MUKDEN City are separate conscription areas. As indicated above, the number of these Districts has been increased at least twice.

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Uniform:- The uniform of the Manchukuoan soldier is almost identical with that of the Japanese, a minor change being in the use of rank badges worn on the shoulder instead of on the collar. The cap insignia is like the Japanese five-pointed star but, instead of solid gold color, the "Manchukuo National colors" of yellow, red, blue, white and black are used. Caps are old style Japanese Army field service caps. Officers carry the curved Japanese samurai sword.

Strength:- The T/O strength of the Manchukuoan Army, which is believed to be approximately equal to operational strength, is estimated at 300,000. This estimate is based primarily upon unit identifications and represents a total of 227,000 for the identified units plus an allowance of 73,000 for miscellaneous and unidentified units. The estimate represents only the strength of troops which are components of the Manchukuoan Army and does not include Manchukuoans in Japanese Army units or Manchukuoans in the service of the Japanese in any other military or semi-military capacity. It, therefore, differs from the estimate of 500,000 made by the Order of Battle Conference in July 44, which was established before evidence on unit identifications was available and represented a maximum figure for all Manchukuoans serving with the Japanese in a military or semi-military capacity.

Numerous reports received subsequent to the Conference indicate that the Japanese may have absorbed Manchukuoans into Japanese Army Units but none has as yet been identified in those units. To the extent that they are included in regular Japanese units now identified, their strength is included in the strength estimate for the Japanese Army; to the extent, however, that they are in "special" types of units, their strength is not included in either the strength of the Japanese Army or the Manchukuoan Army, since the non-Japanese personnel of these units are believed to be laborers.

CHINESE PUPPETS:

Strength and Classification:- The strength estimate for Chinese puppet forces has been raised to 910,000 from 474,000, distributed as follows:

	Regular Troops	Provincial Troops	Total
NORTH CHINA	152,000	293,000	445,000
CENTRAL CHINA	153,000	173,000	328,000
SOUTH CHINA	57,000	42,000	99,000
INNER MONGOLIA	12,000	26,000	38,000
	374,000	536,000	910,000

The previous strength estimate was made on the basis of general considerations at a time when little information on the organization of Chinese puppets was available. The new estimated unit strengths and an estimated proportion or regular to provincial troops. Police (Keisatsu) are not included in any of the estimates.#

#Estimated police strength is 175,000, distributed as follows: N CHINA, 100,000; CENTRAL CHINA, 55,000; S CHINA, 15,000; INNER MONGOLIA, 5,000.

PUPPET FORCES IN MANCHUKUO AND CHINA (CONTD)

The extent to which conscription has actually been carried out is unknown. There is evidence that until 1937 the Manchukuoan Army consisted entirely of professional soldiers. Between 1937 and 1940, there was a haphazard system of conscription, locally enforced, to select some 18,000 men a year for a term of three years. In April 1940 the new National Army Law, comparable to the Japanese Military Service Law, became effective regularizing the conscription for a term of three years of all male subjects of MANCHUKUO who had reached the age of nineteen years during the preceding calendar year.

KWANTUNG ARMY — JAPANESE AMBASSADOR

YEAR	MILITARY AFFAIRS DISTRICTS	CONSCRIPTION AREAS (Provinces unless otherwise indicated)		
1935	1st - HSINKING			
	2d - MUKDEN	MUKDEN (FENGTIEN)	ANTUNG	
	3d - KIRIN	KIRIN	CHIENTAO	
	4th - TSITSIHAR	LUNKIANG	REIHO	
	5th - HARBIN	PINKIANG	SANKIANG	
	6th - CHINGCHOU	CHINCHOU	JEHOL	
1941	1st - HSINKING	KIRIN SSUPING	CHIENTAO	TUNGHUA
	2d - HARBIN	PINCHIANG	HEIHO	PEIAN
	3d - TSITSIHAR	LUNKIANG S HSINGAN	E HSINGAN	N HSINGAN
	4th - MUTANCHIANG	MUTANCHIANG	SANCHIANG	TUNGAN
	5th - MUKDEN	MUKDEN (FENGTIEN)	ANTUNG	
	6th - CHINCHOU	CHINCHOU	W HSINGAN	JEHOL
	7th - DAIREN			
1943	1st - HSINKING	KIRIN	HSINKING Special Municipality	
	2d - MUKDEN	MUKDEN (FENGTIEN)	MUKDEN (city)	
	3d - TUNGHUA	SSUPING	TUNGHUA	ANTUNG
	4th - CHINCHOU	W HSINGAN	CHINCHOU	JEHOL
	5th - CHIENTAO	CHIENTAO		
	6th - TSITSIHAR	TSITSIHAR E HSINGAN	N HSINGAN	S HSINGAN
	7th - HARBIN	HARBIN	PEIAN	HEIHO
	8th - MUTANCHIANG	MUTANCHIANG	TUNGAN	SANCHIANG
	9th - DAIREN	KWANTUNG		

While two categories of puppets, i.e. regular troops (Chiangun frequently translated "Pacification Armies") and provincial troops (Hoantai - frequently translated "Peace Preservation Corps") are known to exist, allocation of identified units between these two types is extremely difficult and in many instances has been made arbitrarily. Regular forces are generally controlled by the NANKING government. It is believed that Hoantai are second-line troops, mostly controlled by provincial governments, and the term "provincial troops" has been adopted to designate this general class. Both types are generally controlled by Japanese advisors and the principal functions of both types appear to be to supplement Japanese garrisons controlling occupied territories and to guard lines of communication between Japanese garrisons. Both types are being used in Japanese combat operations, principally in N CHINA in operations against Chinese Communists.

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Most provincial troops may be further classified into militia (Shohoantai) and local defense troops (Hsienhoantai), sometimes referred to as district garrison units (Hsien Keibitai).

Control:- With the following major exceptions, all of the regular forces are nominally controlled directly by the puppet Nanking government of Chen Kung-po (successor to the late Wang Ching-wei):

1. The North China Pacification Army is a military body under the North China Political Council which in turn is responsible to the Nanking Government.

2. The People's National Army in S CHINA was organized by the Japanese independent of NANKING and is responsible directly to the Japanese.

3. Inner Mongolian puppet forces are a separate army under Prince Te, head of the autonomous government of INNER MONGOLIA.

Besides these major exceptions, there are numerous small groups which cooperate directly with the Japanese. These are, however, considered regular troops in the strength estimate set forth above.

The provincial troops, as indicated above, are believed to be subject to control by the puppet provincial organization.

Organization:- The Chinese puppet forces were drawn from heterogeneous sources. A large part of the puppets (estimated by Chinese communists to be 62%) are former Kuomintang troops. Local war lords and their troops have been brought under Japanese influence and additional men have been procured by forced recruitment. Considerable diversity in form of organization resulted but the Japanese appear to be working towards a national army organization. For example, in Oct 44, the Second Group Army, the twenty-fourth Group Army and the North Honan Communist Suppression Army were reorganized, their commanders becoming commanders of the Fourth Fifth and Sixth Area Armies respectively. A clearer pattern of organization of the Chinese puppets should gradually become evident.

Although there are many instances where standard organization has not been achieved, the pattern of organization for which the Japanese appear to be striving is generally a triangular one. The largest unit, the Area Army, is composed of a varying number of armies, each having three infantry divisions. The scheme of organization appears to contemplate divisions consisting of three infantry regiments, each in turn composed of three battalions, plus, in some cases, a battalion of artillery and other supporting elements. The strength of puppet divisions varies widely, but the average strength is estimated at 3,000. No evidence is available as to whether such units have a definite T/O strength as distinguished from operational or actual strength; pending further evidence these strengths are assumed to be the same.

The battalion is the tactical unit of provincial troops. Most of the provincial troops are believed to be of the "local defense" type.

Armament:- The NANKING government supplies arms, principally captured materiel, to the regular troops and militia which it controls. It is probable that the North China Political Council performs the same function for such troops as it controls. Provincial districts are responsible for arming local defense troops, but, for particular campaigns, the Japanese may assist in arming of these troops. The degree to which even regular troops are armed varies widely and specific instances have been reported in which only a third of the men in a local defense battalion carried rifles.

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PUPPET FORCES IN MANCHUKUO AND CHINA

Rifles and pistols are the principal arms. Some regular divisions have artillery units, and both regular troops and militia may be found with machine guns, mortars and grenade dischargers. Local defense troops will seldom be encountered with anything but light arms.

Tactical Use:- The tactical use of puppet forces is controlled by the Japanese officer in charge of the operations and puppet forces are seldom permitted to operate independently. Where they have been used against Communists, large numbers of desertions (often whole units) have been reported. While their military efficiency varies and is comparatively low, they perform many functions which would otherwise occupy Japanese troops.

Dogs and Cats

(From WD, MID, Captured Personnel and Materiel Branch, Report No 63, 1 Feb 45)

The Japanese have special men to go around and pick up all dogs and cats that seem to be running loose. PW witnessed one argument at the Bund Hotel when the owner tried to stop the dogcatcher from removing two dogs. While the dogcatcher was explaining that it was his duty to remove all dogs that were loose, a seaman went down and fetched the dogs.

It was later explained to the men that the reason for this activity was to conserve the food supply, but some added that the population might be getting dogmeat for the table. This story was given some impetus when one of the seamen explained that he had been able to obtain a date with one of the Japanese girls by giving her a nice fat dog he had been seen with in the past. This led PW to believe more conclusively that dogs were going on the family table.

NOTE: - PW referred to above is a German 3/C Petty Officer whose ship blew up in YOKOHAMA Harbor - cause believed to be sabotage. PW spent considerable time in JAPAN, and his basic information checks with known facts. He jumped the ship off CEBU and swam to shore, where he was picked up by the Filipinos.

BRIEFS

BOOBY TRAPS AND MINES ON IWO

Booby traps and mines in large numbers have been found on IWO JIMA. POACOMMENT:- this constitutes further evidence of the increased trend in Jap tactics towards the skilfull and extensive use of booby traps and mines. (SECRET)

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Discussion of Free Balloons

(From General Report #1 on Free Balloons and Related Incidents, WD, MID G-2, Wash. D.C. 29 Jan 45)

Since 4 Nov 44 there have been found in the United States, Canada, Alaska and Hawaii ten balloons and four bombs believed to be of Japanese origin. A number of other incidents and sightings, possibly related, have been reported.

The Japanese may be sending out the balloons for one or more of the following purposes:

a. Ranging Shots

b. Transportation of Incendiary and Anti-personnel bombs.

c. Bacteriological Warfare.

d. Transportation of Agents.

e. Anti-aircraft Devices.

Ranging Shots:- Prevailing winds are such that it is possible to send balloons from Japan to the United States at great heights (15,000 to 25,000 feet) in 30 to 60 hours. The balloon episodes to date most probably are "ranging shots," in preparation for mass launchings of such balloons. The possibility also exists that the balloons are being used to determine meteorological conditions, in preparation for launching of some type of projectile.

Ranging requires a knowledge of the balloon's course and the point at which it lands. One of the balloons so far recovered carried a radio transmitter (range about 1,000 miles) which would have enabled the Japanese to plot the balloon's course by taking direction findings from submarines and other receiving stations along the route. To prevent the Japanese from obtaining information as to points at which the balloons land, it is essential that strict censorship be applied to all balloon incidents.

Transportation of Incendiary and Anti-Personnel Bombs:- The balloons very probably will be used to transport incendiary and anti-personnel bombs, which can be dropped during flight by means of ballast-release device designed to operate when ever the balloon descends below a certain altitude. Widespread release of incendiary bombs in heavily forested areas--where most of the balloons so far discovered have landed--would have serious effects during the dry season. Incendiary bombs dropped during the wet season might be of delayed-action type which does not ignite until the surrounding ground has dried.

Anti-personnel bombs will probably be employed as a harassing device, and would also have some incendiary effect.

Bacteriological Warfare:- The intense cold at the altitude of the balloons' flight would facilitate the transmission of bacteria, and disease germs affecting humans, animals, crops and forests could be transported.

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DISCUSSION OF FREE BALLOONS (CONTD)

The contents of two small boxes found with two of the balloons are under analysis. To date there is no evidence that the boxes contain bacteriological warfare agents, but a final report cannot be made until experiments now in progress have been completed.

Transportation of Agents:- It is considered unlikely that the balloons have been or will be used to transport personnel from JAPAN, since the long trip through the stratosphere would require too much equipment. The fact that the balloons have an automatic ballast-dropping device also suggests that they are not intended to carry personnel. A balloon could however, be partially inflated from a submarine and make a relatively short trip inland.

Anti-aircraft Devices:- It is considered unlikely that the balloons are anti-aircraft devices. Free balloons would be of comparatively little effect in intercepting high-altitude aircraft. Furthermore it is improbable that the balloons are used as aircraft-warning devices, since they have an automatic ballast-release designed to permit a sustained flight which would quickly carry the balloons away from JAPAN.

Launching:- On the basis of the following, it is believed that the balloons probably were launched from JAPAN or nearby:

The balloons have a self-destructive device and it is probable that only a small percentage of those launched has landed intact. It is also probable that only a small proportion of those which have landed intact has been recovered. It is likely, therefore, that a considerable number has come over--enough to make it improbable that they were launched from submarines (the only other likely point of origin).

The balloons have used an automatic ballast-release, which makes possible a sustained flight. The fact that the ballast has been exhausted on most of the balloons recovered suggests that they have travelled a considerable distance.

Known prevailing winds would carry the balloons from JAPAN in the direction of NORTH AMERICA.

Reliable meteorological texts report that at an altitude of 25,000 feet there is an air current that crosses JAPAN to the west, veers southward to HAWAII, then swings to the north, crossing Northern CALIFORNIA and part of MONTANA where it again veers southward.

B-29s have verified the existence of strong westerly winds at high altitudes over JAPAN.

Speed:- A balloon at 25,000 feet would be carried eastward from JAPAN at a speed of from 30 to 60 miles an hour, perhaps even faster.

Chemical Warfare Aspects of Japanese Pilotless Balloons.

Both gas and incendiary bombs may be dropped from such balloons, equipped with automatic mechanisms designed to release missiles at predetermined intervals of time. However, this method would be extremely ineffective for gas warfare as it lends itself neither to accuracy nor to building up the requisite lethal concentrations. It is difficult to believe that the enemy will resort to such a random, hit or miss and futile method.

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DISCUSSION OF FREE BALLOONS (CONTD)

Incendiaries, on the other hand, present a different picture. They require neither accuracy nor a large concentration to be effective. A single incendiary bomb may do as much damage as a dozen, provided it strikes a spot where combustible dry materials are present. Thus, fires in forests and fields of grain could readily be started over widely scattered areas during periods of dry weather by means of the balloons under discussion.

The current use of pilotless balloons by the Japanese may be preparatory to employing them for the above mentioned purpose. If such is the case, it is unfortunate that the press has unintentionally cooperated with the enemy by reporting the landing places of several balloons. This information should aid the Japanese considerably in estimating the speed and general direction of winds blowing from the Pacific over the western portion of the UNITED STATES and CANADA.

It is considered highly improbable that the Japanese will attempt to employ incendiary bombs to start forest fires during the winter months with the forests covered with snow. It may be necessary, however, to revise this opinion upon receipt of further information concerning the bomb reported landed from a balloon 21 January 1945. The Japanese may have a bomb similar to the German Streubrand C 500 incendiary bomb reported to function as follows:

The bomb contains approximately 1200 small celluloid boxes filled with granular magnesium. On top of each box there is a small piece of white phosphorous covered and held in place by a damp cloth. Upon release from the bomb these boxes are scattered over a wide area and lie dormant as long as the cloth retains its original dampness or can draw humidity from the wet ground by capillary action. However, upon drying the white phosphorous catches fire spontaneously and in turn ignites the celluloid box and magnesium. It is reported that this bomb was particularly designed for use against grain crops.

The Japanese are presumably familiar with delayed action fuzes of German origin, such as the chemical delay fuze and the clock mechanism fuze, which may be adjusted to function over periods of two to forty days. Such fuzes, however, would hardly be employed at this season of the year for the purpose mentioned.

Discussion of Balloons as BW agents.

The paper balloons are sturdy, well made, and can be turned out in large quantities (thousands or hundreds of thousands). Furthermore, due to prevailing winds of predictable character and other known atmospheric conditions, it should be possible to send such balloons from JAPAN to the UNITED STATES at great heights (15,000 to 25,000 feet) in 30 to 60 hours. It is estimated that they can carry a load of 450 pounds. By actual test a man weighing 165 pounds was supported by the rope and rubber snubber attached to the paper balloon.

It appears at least theoretically practical to send large numbers of sturdy, inexpensive balloons from JAPAN to the UNITED STATES within short periods of time. These vehicles, capable of carrying several hundred pound loads, would travel at altitudes of 15,000 to 25,000 feet. If the starting point of the balloons is JAPAN, it appears that accuracy of destination is minimal or entirely lacking (that is, beyond the point of having the vehicles land in the UNITED STATES Proper). In this respect, however, it should be pointed out that it was the opinion of one of the N.R.L. investigators that a partially deflated balloon could be released from a submarine relatively close to the west coast of the UNITED STATES and land with some degree of accuracy: e.g., within the city limits of LOS ANGELES.

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DISCUSSION OF FREE BALLOONS (CONTD)

It is desirable to determine whether BW might be carried out with such balloons. In spite of the fact that there is no specific evidence at hand that the two balloons examined did carry BW loads, it nevertheless is well within theoretical limits for such vehicles to carry and disperse bacterial agents. The type of agent chosen would depend upon the degree of accuracy with which the balloons could be sent. In the event that city limits were to be the site of the landing, effective agents would be either those epidemic in character (e.g. pneumonic plague) or non-epidemic agents easily transmissable via the respiratory tract (e.g., psittacosis). If non-accurate dispersion were attempted, insectborne agents or those affecting live stock would be indicated. In the insect-borne group the mission might be accomplished by distribution of properly prepared bait or by infection of animals upon which the mosquito feeds. One of the most likely agents might well be the Japanese B Encephalitis since it has been shown that this virus can be transmitted by every mosquito capable of carrying equine encephalomyelitis (Eastern and Western) and St Louis encephalitis. So far as is known, there is not at present a focus of Japanese B. in this country. It would thus be theoretically possible to infect our vast Culicine population and establish a permanent endemic focus of an agent which under natural conditions in JAPAN (1924) produced 7,000 cases with 4,000 deaths and numerous aequalae and complications. It should be pointed out that Culex tarsalis is one of the most common mosquitoes of our western area and the most efficient carrier of the encephalitides.

If this type of wholesale distribution were used on our pasture lands with our important food producing animals as the ultimate target, the bacillus of anthrax, the viruses of Foot and Mouth disease, and Rinderpest might be effective.

Although several examples of BW agents have been given, it is important not to focus attention on a few diseases. A BW threat might involve various representatives of air-borne, food-borne, and water-borne agents. No single infectious disease can be disregarded since it must be assumed that enemy ingenuity might make use of unusual routes of infection and synergistic action of mixed infections. The possibility of CW and BW mixtures should also be considered in any preparations which may be made to meet this threat.

Certain factors might favor dispersion of BW agents via a balloon. The vehicle is expected to travel at high altitudes at temperatures (-20 to -50°C.) optimal for maintaining the potencies of biological agents. It is possible that munitions might be devised to release agents in the form of a spray, thereby avoiding potency losses from concussion and heat.

It should be emphasized that before BW agents can be effectively dispersed, technical difficulties must be overcome. The foregoing speculations are based on the assumption that the enemy has overcome all or part of these difficulties.

It is considered improbable that effective damage to economic crops could be caused by the introduction by such balloons of biological agents producing plant diseases unless very large numbers were employed. The plant pathogens are in general specific for particular species or groups of plants, and in addition require certain favorable combinations of meteorological conditions to permit infection to occur. Somewhat more likely might be the introduction of insects damaging crops, though the great heights suggested as probably occurring enroute would require that protection be provided against freezing.

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In order to obtain material for study the closest possible liaison should be maintained with all agencies likely to sight the balloons.

Machinery should be set up permitting a team of BW officers to reach the balloon before anything has been touched. It would be the function of these individuals to make general examinations and obtain specimens for detailed study in the laboratory.

Arrangements will be made for adequate study of any specimens which may be forthcoming.

In addition to immediate testing, BW officers should be allowed to maintain a close watch on the area involved. Since the pay load might be dropped at a distance from the point of landing of the balloon, tests should be carried out on rodents, insects, etc in the given area during a period of time after the discovery of the balloon.

Close liaison should be maintained with public health authorities to obtain unusual epidemiological data and specimens from patients or postmortem material (human or animal) in a relatively large area (100 to 200 miles) near the balloon.

NOTE: It is apparent that recommendations have been limited to Intelligence investigations. It seems hardly feasible to take any other steps at this time since our primary concern would be to confirm that BW had been employed by the enemy. When positive evidence is forthcoming as to the nature and scope of the attack, other defensive measures would naturally be in order.

BRIEFS.

SUICIDE UNITS

Recovered at ANGIO, LUZON, an undated Jap notebook described Suicide Units as composed of first year men; leader and two men equipped with five hand grenades and some explosives. Machetes, rifles were considered impracticable. Notebook contains instructions from officer to bayonet and execute all natives, warns that the enemy uses war dogs and covers the road with needle-like articles, making it impossible to pass with rubber-soled bifurcated shoes. (ATIS,SWPA Bull #1760, 13 Feb 45.)(Confidential)

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Japan's Latest Secret Weapon

(From Hq SWPA Daily Summary No. 1044, 3/4 Jan 45)

A PW from the 12th Communication Boat Battalion which was organized at UJINA, Oct 44 by the Jap Army stated:

"The latest ultra secret weapon of the Japanese Army was the one-man depth-charge boat. There were 100 boats in the Battalion. These were one-man boats made of plywood, powered by a six-cylinder, 60 HP motor, manufactured by the NISSAN Motor Co. They were capable of a speed of 20 knots but when fully loaded could make about 18 knots. They had a range of approximately ten hours at average speed. The purpose of these boats was to attack enemy convoys approaching a beach. A boat would head for a transport at top speed and as soon as it was in a position to strike the hull of the ship at the position of the engine room, it would make a U turn and drop depth charges which were in two racks at the stern of the boat. By cutting a string the depth charges were released and the boat was in a position to make a speedy getaway. There was a four second time allowance between the release of the depth charges and their explosion. The release of the depth charges, to be effective, had to be at least five meters (16 ft) from the ship attacked. In most cases it was expected that the operator of the boat would be killed."

NOTE: The above described boat is probably the type of small craft used by the enemy in attack against our BATANGAS shipping during the night 31 Jan - 1 Feb.

FILES

ATTENTION RECOGNITION CLASSES

(From CINCPOA Adv Hq radio, 12 Feb 45)

Now operating in forward area is the P51-D Mustang with tear drop canopy. Wide dissemination should be given this fact, and the attention of all personnel should be called to the recognition features of this Army fighter.

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Jap Defenses on Leyte

(From G-2 Summary, Hq, 77th Div, "Liberation of LEYTE")

COGON (including the stone church N across the ANTILAO River from ORMOC, the village between the church and the Highway #2 - LILOAN RJ, and a knife ridge the SW tip of which is E across Highway #2 and a 300 yard rice paddy from the church) was organized as a battalion position facing N. However, before being finally conquered, it had become a regimental position for all around defense. The 2-story stone church building was honey-combed from top to bottom with MG emplacements and sniper posts and also utilized as an OP. For 100 yards around the building and an area extending N through COGON Village there were deep covered foxholes every few yards. Some of these holes had coconut log and dirt covers, others used improvised sheet metal and earth lids. One was covered with an upturned metal bathtub. Each had only a small firing port and a narrow fire lane but the various holes were mutually supporting. Such defenses withstood artillery shelling, M-8, M-10 and bazooka fire and succumbed only to the efforts of an armored bulldozer. The supporting ridge position to the east was organized with foxholes, spider holes and MG pits dug in at the bases of trees and in the bamboo clumps. At Highway #2 - LILOAN RJ were trenches three to four feet deep along the flanks of a MG emplacement on a slight rise which commanded Highway #2 both N and S.

From COGON via TAMBUCO and HUATON to CATAYOM there were many foxholes along both sides of the road in the ditches and under the shacks. Some of these holes were six to seven feet deep, and dug on a slant. At TAMBUCO a company position of fox holes extended 400 yards astride Highway #2 with MG emplacements on the flanks and at the RJ. At this point a reinforced concrete foundation was utilized by Japs as an improvised emplacement. With the exception of this position, the defense along Highway #2 consisted of a succession of foxholes and MG pits covering the road but not integrated into an organized defense. However, about twelve field artillery pieces were captured or destroyed along Highway #2 between TAMBUCO and CATAYOM. These were not dug in but were merely placed along the road. One 75mm gun guarding a bridge was well hidden inside a roadside shack. The battalion which defended in the vicinity of CABULIHAN had no time to develop defensive installations other than hastily dug holes. There were no elaborate defensive installations at VALENCIA or the airfield.

MATAGOB and the area surrounding it were pockmarked with foxholes and emplacements. The usual holes were found under the houses. The position was occupied by only a few Jap riflemen, rather than the battalion or more for which it was originally prepared.

A regimental defensive position protected the LIBUNGAO - LIBUNGAO RJ - TAGBONG River Bridge Area. The troop dispositions included a battalion in position, in the vicinity of the bridge, with the bulk of the regiment dug in W, S, and E of the RJ. The installations consisted of foxholes and MG pits, unusually well sited and coordinated. In addition, a full track personnel carrier in defilade was used as a LMG emplacement. The reinforced battalion at the TAGBONG River Bridge utilized as an anchor position foxholes on a steep knoll, NW of the bridge. However, the stubborn defense of this area was due more to the quality and savagery of the defending 5th Regiment and to its repeated counterattacks than to any elaborate installations.

See illustrations on following two pages.

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The Stone Church after the Position Was Taken

One of the Angles in the Church Wall Which Provided Cover for Jap Defenders




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A Deep Foxhole with the Brush Camouflage Removed, near the Stone Church



Jap Holes under a House in ORMOC

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Japanese Bacteriological Research

(From ATIS, SWPA Interrogation Report No. 539, 9 Nov 44)

So that the Jap Army would be prepared for taking countermeasures if bacteria warfare were used by the enemy, research into bacteria warfare was being conducted at laboratories attached to Japanese universities. PW stated that all the universities had research laboratories for normal research and these were also being used for bacteria warfare investigations. The principal one was the Infectious Diseases Research Laboratory at TOKYO. PW said that he knew no details as to how bacteria would be used in war because it was a closely guarded secret in JAPAN. He thought it would be spread by airplanes and guns. Although the Chinese had contaminated wells with bacteria, the Japanese had not retaliated because they were meeting with sufficient success against the Chinese without using this form of warfare.

"Demoniacal Americans"

(From ATIS Bulletin No. 1711, 25 Jan 45)

A captured mimeographed article describing supposed American atrocities is presented here in translation. The article was originally extracted from "MAINICHI" newspaper, and reproduced by the Medical Section OTSU Group.

Summary: - A report describing the difficult conditions under which Japanese soldiers have to fight in the jungles of the south PACIFIC. The article bears the title "Demoniacal American Marines pursued our wounded soldiers and killed them by running over them with tanks. Slaughter these armed madmen !" A description of such supposed atrocities against Japanese wounded is followed by the advice, "Do not manifest the BUSHIDO spirit towards the enemy!"

BRIEFS

IWO JIMA ROCKET BOMBS

250 kg (551¼ lbs) with rocket motor and nose fuze have been identified. These rocket bombs are thought to have been the cause of heavy explosives on D day and D / 1 which were thought to have been heavy mortar or howitzer fire. (SECRET)

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Japanese Use of Window

(From Radar Counter Measure Digest No. 13, 1 Feb 45)

Previously when reports stated that the Japanese had used Window, indications were that the Window length was such as to give maximum interference to radars operating in the low frequency bands. Though this still applies, two reports received recently have implied that the Janapanese may be attempting to inflict interference on radars of higher frequency. This new aspect is best presented by quoting from the reports mentioned.

In an extract from a report of the Division of Naval Intelligence, it is found that during attacks on Naval units in the FORMOSA area Window was employed quite generally by the Japanese. Indications of this interference were seen on two naval radars, which operate in widely differing bands.

On the low frequency radar "it appeared as a slightly less than saturation echo of about 3 mile depth...," "The reflections stayed for approximately 20 minutes."

On the high frequency radar "at first the signal was strong, slightly fuzzy, gradually dispersing into a short, fuzzy, wide-based echo and finally disappeared after about 40 seconds."-- "It is not believed that Window dropped during attacks in the FORMOSA area was cut for 10 centimeter wavelengths."

The fact that the interference had been seen on the radar operating in the high frequency band is substantiated to some extent by information received from American forces in CHINA. Although no friendly radar sets were operating during the attack mentioned in this report, several bits of metal foil were found in that vicinity a few days later. One complete strip of foil has been found which measured 60.7 cm x 5.35 cm (24" x 2.1") indicating that it would be effective in the 200 to 250 mc region.

"From samples gathered it was learned that very thin metal foil(probably aluminum or tin) has been used without any backing whatsoever. Creases, most likely due to folding, are evident at 3.5 cm (1.4") intervals. Due to the lack of backing for strengthening, the foil is generally torn along these folding creases."---"The lack of proper backing in this case is noteworthy. Two explanations are suggested: The Japanese did not think that the metal strips would be torn apart; in which case they expected to cover the range between 200 and 250 mc effectively. Or, the Japanese used the fragile foil on purpose with the expectation that it breaks into many different sized fragments in order to clutter up the microwave region.

"The second possibility seems reasonable if it is suggested that the Japanese expected Window deception against night fighters equipped with microwave radar."

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Japanese Tanks Encountered on Luzon

(From Hq Sixth Army G-2 Weekly Report No. 72, 24 Jan 45)

To date three types of Japanese tanks have been encountered by our forces in this area. These are the Model 2595 Light Tank; Model 2597 Medium Tank; and a Medium Tank as yet unidentified.

Light Tank, Model 2595, Characteristics:	
Weight	10 tons (loaded)
Length	14 feet 4 inches
Height	7 feet
Crew	3 men
Armor	6 to 12 mm
Armament	1 37mm Model 94 Tank Gun, 1 7.7mm MG in turret, 1 7.7mm MG in hull.

Medium Tank, Model 2597, Characteristics:	
Weight	15 tons
Length	18 feet
Height	7 feet 8 inches
Crew	4 men
Armor	8 to 25mm
Armament	1 57mm gun, 1 7.7mm MG in turret, 1 7.7mm MG in hull.

Medium Tank, Unidentified, General:- Probably first manufactured in 1939. First reported from the CBI Theatre. With the exception of the turret and the main armament, it is basically the same design as the Model 97 Medium Tank. The turret has been improved to accommodate a high velocity 47mm gun. The long overhang of the turret also provides more room for stowage of ammunition.

Characteristics:	
Weight	15 tons (approx)
Length	18 feet (approx)
Height	
Crew	4 men
Armor	8 to 25mm (approx)
Armament	1 47mm Model 1 Tank Gun, 1 7.7mm MG in turret, 1 7.7 mm MG in hull.

Capabilities- This tank is characteristic of all Japanese tanks in that it has a high power/weight ratio, which should give it a fairly high speed.

The use of the 47mm gun, which is the 47mm anti-tank gun, Model 1, adapted for tank mounting, greatly increases its effectiveness against our armor. This gun has a muzzle velocity of 2700 feet per second and uses AP/HE and HE ammunition. In a tank battle near URDANETA, several of these tanks were encountered by our Mediums. Three of our tanks were put out of action by fire from the 47mm gun. On one of our M4's six complete penetrations were observed. All rounds (AP/HE) penetrated the side of the tank. It is interesting to note that a document found in one of the Japanese medium tanks knocked out near BINALONAN, had sketches of our M4 Medium Tank and M1 Heavy Tank showing the side of the hull as one of the vulnerable points.

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Communication - The tank examined was equipped with two-way radio.

Vulnerability - Bazookas and even 30 calibre rifle fire have proved effective on the above described tank, as well as the other types thus far encountered on LUZON.

Notes on Jap Defense of Breakneck Ridge

(From Hq, Sixth Army G-2 Weekly Report No. 70, 27 Dec 44)

The following notes are from a description of the tactics employed by the enemy in the defense of the very difficult and broken series of ridges (now known as BREAKNECK RIDGE) located south of PINAMOPOAN in northern ORMOC Valley, LEYTE.

The 21st Inf Regt, 24th Div was in action during the period 5-16 Nov 44 under orders to "maintain the initiative at all costs." It suffered 630 battle casualties, against 1779 counted enemy dead. The following is presented as typical of what is to be expected from one of the better Japanese inf divs operating in rough terrain highly advantageous to the defense.

"All who contacted the enemy were impressed with his excellence in battle. Little was noted of reckless charges, needless sacrifices, or failure to observe known tactical principles. The outstanding enemy characteristic was his excellence in fire discipline and control of all arms. Without exception enemy fire was withheld until the moment when its delivery in great volume would give greatest effect.

"During the daily attacks in the following ten days there were numerous instances where enemy defensive areas often consisting of bunkers, eight to twelve machine guns, mortars and one company of riflemen would permit cautiously moving advance elements to pass their excellently concealed positions, and fire on reserve troops moving in more compact formations.

"Enemy snipers were not found in trees although many trees offered good locations. Snipers seldom if ever fired at vehicles on roads, no matter how full of personnel they appeared to be. However, snipers were constantly firing at foot troops on roads, either as single individuals or in formations. Snipers were often posted in nests of three or four. Consequently a volume of sniper fire could be delivered at once, even well behind the front lines. When firing at a single man, a group of four snipers would emit only one shot. This was apparently to conceal the location of the group. Many snipers used telescopic sights. Their fire was extremely accurate.

"Enemy artillery always fired into our positions when our supporting artillery was firing in close support of our own advances. Often this caused calls from rifle units to our artillery to cease firing. Enemy mortars followed the same practice as well as enemy small arms which fired when our automatic weapons fired.

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NOTES ON JAP DEFENSE OF BREAKNECK RIDGE (CONTD)

"The typical shrieking, hysterical, so-called Banzai Charge was noticeably not employed. Enemy counterattacks were supported by mortar fire and automatic weapons.

"Our tank attacks or even movement in column to attack positions had to be guarded in front, flanks and rear by riflemen. This was to prevent suicide attacks by Japs specifically left for that one purpose, with magnetic mines, demolitions or grenades which were inserted in the tracks.

"In no case was an enemy attack upon one of the perimeters of the 21st Inf units successful. Flame throwers and white phosphorous were particularly effective and literally made the Japs squeal.

"Enemy infiltrators at night would cut telephone wire lines and then wait in ambush for linemen to come to make repairs. Litter bearers and aid men drew particularly heavy fire.

"Although the enemy used captured ordnance to supplement his own fire, his snipers used only Japanese rifles. This permitted our troops to detect their location because of the distinctive report.

"The enemy used reverse slope defense tactics effectively. Every reverse slope in the area was well defended. Every foot of the terrain attacked was utilized properly for defense. All of his positions were mutually supporting. Most enemy foxholes were constructed in the shape of an inverted boot. His fire step and firing position towards us was in the toe. The deep heel was used to retire into for cover during our artillery and mortar fire. Enemy artillery pieces were located in covered emplacements well concealed with deep caves behind the gun for protection of gunners.

"In many cases our riflemen failed to dig their foxholes deep enough. During enemy mortar fire they were forced to crouch in their holes because the shallowness prevented them from standing upright. This lost them their observation completely and permitted the enemy to get up to bayonet range to where our riflemen were disadvantageously located to protect themselves. Had they had deep enough foxholes, they could have remained erect and continued firing from cover and better protected themselves from closely advancing enemy infantrymen."

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Greetings, Veteran!

(From OSS, Washington D.C. Bulletin 8 February 45, Subject: Veterans Discharged Because of Wounds Recalled to Service)

On 29 November 1944, the Japanese High Command issued an order recalling veterans who had been discharged because of wounds back to service in the army and navy. It is estimated that almost 300,000 men will be reenlisted. Those affected were ordered to report to conscription centers before 15 December 1944.

It is reported that 200,000 Japanese from 40 to 50 years of age have been enlisted in the reserves. Of these, 50,000 men belong to the navy and 150,000 to the army.

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Indoctrination on Self Destruction

(From Counter Intelligence Bulletin No 54, USAF in Far East)

When volunteers for suicide missions are lacking, apparently not an unusual situation, the Japanese have found a way to indoctrinate their soldiers for glorious death in battle. That the attempted indoctrination failed in this particular instance does not detract from its novelty.

The thirty-four year old lance corporal who had done quite a hitch in the front lines of Upper Laruma River Sector was scarcely the type of soldier one would expect to be chosen for so flattering a mission as dying for the Emperor. Emaciated, weighing only five or six stone, bootless, unkempt, tattered, verminous, covered with beriberi and assorted sores, he was no longer strong enough to dig the unit garden, let alone soldier. Although he took a long while to get up, the last time his corporal knocked him down with a bamboo staff, he was deemed a highly qualified subject for a suicide mission.

The next day, in the presence of his comrades, he was given two hand grenades and told that he must redeem his life by killing as many Australians as he could before they killed him. He was then sent packing for the front line. As a parting gesture and a reminder of the seriousness of his mission, the corporal soundly slapped his face.

Despite this ceremonious and painstaking preparation for a hero's death, the lance corporal let his side down badly. At the first opportunity he threw his grenades away and surrendered to an Australian outpost.

No Surrender, No Wonder

(From Counter Intelligence Bulletin No 54, USAF in Far East)

One of the most startling reasons for not responding to the appeals of US surrender leaflets was given by a captured Japanese NCO.

The PW stated that President Roosevelt had written an article for Life Magazine in which he advocated the castration of all Japanese. Because so many Japanese believed (this type of) propaganda, Allied surrender leaflets made little impression.

It was the PW's opinion, however, that the chief reason for the unwillingness of the Japanese soldier to surrender was the fear that when they returned to JAPAN after the war they would be shot.

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Japanese Armor on Luzon

(From Hq Sixth Army G-2 Weekly Report No 73, 31 Jan 45)

When our troops landed on LUZON they were for the first time confronted with a serious armored threat. The enemy's 2d Armored Division, known to be located in the central plain area, was the first formidable armored force with which American troops had been confronted during the entire SWPA offensive. The question then was, how would the Jap use this weapon -- would he mass it for one sledgehammer blow or would he fritter it away in small localized counterattacks? Precedents were lacking; however, a list of MANCHURIAN maneuver problems indicated that the enemy contemplated using armored task forces smaller than ours and most frequently centered around a tank company. Since S-Day experience has proved this to be the case. The enemy has frittered away a full tank regiment, elements of another and elements of the 2d Mobile Artillery Regt and 2d Mobile Inf Regt.

A total of 77 Medium and 4 light tanks have been knocked out in the I Corps sector. The largest tank actions took place at SAN MANUEL where 41 medium and 4 light tanks were accounted for. However even here the enemy never massed his tanks, but used them to spearhead small-scale counter-attacks.

Jap Artillery on Luzon

(From Hq Sixth Army G-2 Weekly Report No 73, 31 Jan 45)

For the first time in SWPA counteroffensive the enemy has employed artillery in mass. Prior to the LUZON campaign even a battery concentration was exceptional; the enemy's usual practice has been to use single guns. However, in the I Corps sector, our troops have encountered not only large concentrations of artillery, but artillery skillfully emplaced in difficult terrain.

BRIEFS

GAS IN CHINA

The Japanese used gas in the fighting around TANGCHIACHA, causing 20 casualties among the militia men. (Secret).
(OSS, Wash., D.C. Bul., 31 Jan 45 "Occupied China- Recent Sabotage Activities of the Inhabitants of North Kiangsu Province)

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Disorganization at Clark Field

(From Hq AAF SWPA, Intelligence Summary No 258)

The following report was written by an intelligence officer of the Allied Air Force Hq who went into CLARK Air Center shortly after the ground troops entry. At the time the report was written, 3 Feb, certain portions of the Air Center were still in process of being taken from the enemy. Most of his report was based on observation, the balance from interrogations of Allied technical and intelligence personnel who preceded him.

"The MANILA Air Depot is not what it used to be. Day before yesterday we moved down here to Clark #5, and since then I have been to all the concentrations of buildings where an establishment the size of the MAD would probably be. There is abundant evidence on every hand that the Japanese evacuated the large buildings and Hqs some time ago, and split up into little cells all over the place.

"Some time ago, presumably after the October strikes began working on the Clark area, the comfortable living in American built barracks and buildings and the using of American hangars and warehouses by the Japanese came to an end. Apparently conditions were such that it was impossible to occupy these places and continue to live. At that time, the Japanese Air Services, as such, apparently ceased to be a machine and became a piecemeal hodgpodge, operating on a day-to-day basis. Repair shops, storage dumps and maintenance units, - all were dispersed over the entire area from [illegible] to the south beyond Clark. Since that time, there has been no effective control of the flow of supplies, no proper supervision of repairs and maintenance and in short, no organization.

"It is impossible to describe the situation as a whole beyond saying that everywhere is evidence of disorganization and general shambles. To mention a few straws in the wind; over two hundred new engines, most of them never uncrated, were found in MABALACAT Town, never more than 3 or 4 in one place, scattered underneath houses, old rice mills, public buildings, little shacks in outlying districts and even on sidewalks and alleys.

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BRIEFS

TIED TO THE JOB

During the LINGAYEN operation, the dead pilot of a downed Jap plane was found to be shackled by the ankles to the rudder controls of his plane. It is believed that the shackling is a part of the Bushido code of the Black Dragon Society, the apparent theory being that this act is evidence to the spirits that the warrior is a loyal Bushido. (SWPA Intell. Sum. No 254, 13 Jan 45) (Confidential)

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DISORGANIZATION AT CLARK FIELD (CONTD)

In addition, tremendous amounts of parts such as carburetors, fuel pumps, generators, propellers, guns, tires, wheels, and struts, etc., were also found scattered in the same manner. Well over half of these parts were buried in backyards, under houses and thrown all over fields. Tools were also buried all over. I personally dug up a dozen or more caches, and found a few papers in almost all of them. Never any unit larger than an airdrome battalion was mentioned.

"Dozens of planes are scattered over every strip, and the total is certainly over 500 already actually seen by our boys, yet much of the revetment area to the south is still under fire and inaccessible at the moment but is reported to have hundreds more.

"Why did the Japanese leave these planes here? Of course many were strafed on the ground and burned out. Yet there are many which are still untouched by our attacks and apparently lack only one little part or bit of maintenance. Some are even virtually flyable as is. Many more must have been stranded here originally and grounded, then subsequently strafed by our planes.

"Three possible reasons for all this are lack of pilots, lack of fuel or lack of maintenance. We have found ample fuel, however, on almost every strip (buried of course, and well dispersed). There is also no evidence that the Japanese lacked pilots.

"This leaves lack of maintenance as the most probable cause for the disorganization. As air reinforcements were poured into the P.I. in response to October Allied strikes, the reinforcements probably arrived to find that the ground organization necessary to keep them on a business footing was shot. A GEORGE for example at CLARK needed a carburetor, but could not get one because all of the GEORGE carburetors were buried up at MABALACAT. The result was the planes were virtually stranded, struggling along as best they could on whatever they could piece together or find laying around.

Airplane Types:- "A sketchy and incomplete round-up, of the Clark area reveals that every type of Army plane now operational has been found, including TOJO. There is a great prevalence of NICK, indicating that there must have been several NICK outfits here. Also a number of FRANKS, and many GEORGES were found. There was also a number of TONYS. Not a single JACK as yet has been noted."

BRIEFS

LAST RESORT GAS ON LUZON

In MALATE, LUZON, Nip stragglers resorted to the use of gas in a house-to-house skirmish. They launched gas grenades into the courtyard and upper floor of a house occupied by U.S. cavalrymen. The eyes of the men were affected and some became very ill. The occurrence is regarded as the desperate act of a few pocketed Japs rather than as a trend towards widespread use of gas by the enemy. (HQ, SWPA Daily Sum, No. 1055, 14/15 Feb 45) (SECRET)

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Blue Print For Patrols

(From Hq, Army Ground Forces, Army War College,
Washington, D.C., letter 14 Feb 1945,
subject, Battle Experiences)

The following report on a successful system of patrol planning and employment by a US cavalry reconnaissance squadron (mechanized) emphasizes early and detailed planning and interrogation, using standard written forms for conveying and recording information. The method so far has been employed only in a static situation.

The patrol orders are given to the patrol leader at least 36 hours before the time to depart, and he issues his order to the patrol in time to allow 24 hours for preparation, reconnaissance and inspections. The mission is made out on a fixed form sheet; the patrol leader puts his plan down in detail on another form, and upon return from the mission the patrol leader is interrogated by the battalion S-2 or S-3 and all information set down in detail on still another form. The interrogation system has proved more effective than requiring the patrol leader to submit a report because many small details otherwise overlooked are brought out by the interrogator. The system has paid dividends in more efficient planning, conduct and execution of patrol activity.

The mission form given to the patrol leader includes the patrol's mission, size, times of departing and returning, routes and special instructions such as other patrols operating in the vicinity during the period.

The detailed plan which the patrol leader must prepare in writing includes, in addition to the above information, an alternate route, formation to be employed, communications plan, signals for control, disposition of any attached personnel (artillery, medical, engineers), method of employment of supporting weapons, action of patrol upon contact with enemy or upon discovery of mines and booby traps, plan of defense if ambushed, assembly or rallying point if elements are separated, and the support to be called upon if ambushed.

The interrogation form records all information obtained, such as actual times of departure and return, and the routes actually followed, enemy observed, prisoners taken, action taken under special circumstances, and patrol losses, if any.

BRIEFS

77th DIVISION ARTILLERY ON LEYTE

"All round defense of artillery positions (US) by artillerymen was necessary to keep down sniper fire and prevent suicide infiltrators from destroying our pieces with satchel and pole charges at night. This required batteries within battalions to be close together. During the day, artillery patrols reconnoitered and combed close-in areas to clean out snipers."
(Hq 77th Div Arty Ops Sum.) (SECRET)

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Japanese Type 95 Heavy Tank

(From ATIS SWPA Bulletin No 1735)

Several Japanese prisoners of war have affirmed the existence of a Jap "heavy" tank weighing approximately 30 tons and have furnished some specifications and performance data on this tank. While the statements of these prisoners show some discrepancies as to details, the existence of such a tank, at least in a developmental stage, is thought to be fairly well established.

The Japanese are capable of designing and producing modern tanks, and their realization of the inferiority of their armor as compared to Allied equipment, coupled with the approach of our forces to terrain suitable for large scale employment of tanks, has probably resulted in increased effort to produce more modern equipment.

The available details of the 30-ton tank indicate that it is a considerable improvement over the well-known Jap medium tanks both in armor and armament, though still inferior to the US medium in these respects.

The latest and most complete data concerning a Jap heavy tank of about 30 tons was obtained from a document captured on LEYTE on 28 December 1944, which consisted of an undated handwritten file containing specifications of various armored vehicles. This document was translated by ATIS, SWPA and published in ATIS Bulletin #1735. The specifications of the heavy tank are given in tabular form along with specifications of five other armored vehicles, including Type 89 and Type 97 tanks. The specifications of the Types 89 and 97 tanks, as given in this table, agree very closely with previous information. This lends credence to the data given on the heavy tank.

Specifications and performance figures for the "Type 95 Heavy Tank" as given in the captured document are given below. These figures have been converted from the metric to the English system.

Type 95 Heavy Tank Specifications:-

Weight	Approx 28½ tons
Length	Approx 21 feet
Width	8 feet 10 inches
Height	9 feet 6 inches
Minimum Ground Clearance	1 foot 8 inches
Width of Track	17 inches
Crew	5
Engine	290 horsepower

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BRIEFS

JAP WITHDRAWAL TACTICS

The enemy leaves heavy demolitions, and a light shell of automatic weapons; then as we advance he sets fire to the buildings which are arsenals and burn with terrific explosions. The enemy has made arsenals of the best buildings south of the PASIG River (LUZON). (SWPA Daily Intelsum #1052,11/12 Feb 45) (Secret)

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JAPANESE TYPE 95 HEAVY TANK (CONTD)

Armament	1 - 70mm Tank Cannon 1 - 37mm Tank Cannon 2 - machine guns
Armor (vital sections)	35mm (1.4 inches)
Fuel capacity	100 gallons
Performance	
Trench crossing ability	9 feet 10 inches
Gradient	34°
Maximum speed	13½ mph
Radius of turn	42 feet 6 inches
Cruising	Approx 10 hours

81mm Mortar Shell

(From ATIS, SWPA Bulletin No 1722, 29 Jan 1945)

Taken on LEYTE, date unknown, was a printed sheet with sketches and instructions of projectile handling of the Type 3, 81mm mortar shell. Extracts concerning significant facts about the use of this type shell are presented below:

"This fuze is a combination of time and instantaneous fuze. Therefore, after the fuze has been attached, the time train must be adjusted to the proper graduation according to use.

"Instantaneous: i.e. - when shell bursts upon contact.
"Time: i.e. - when shell is timed for air burst.""POACOMMENT:- apparently the Japs can achieve with this time fuzing of mortar shells the highly effective fragmentation effect of a tree burst.

"Once the shell is fired, irrespective of the setting, it will burst upon contact with any object.

"However, the shell will not burst for a period of two seconds during its flight (200 to 400 m) (656 ft to 1312 ft), even if it contacts trees. Therefore, it is safe to fire from within a thicket.

"For aerial burst (anti-aircraft) always use normal charge (5 increments)."(or increments required for range of 1000-2800 meters (3280 ft - 9184 ft) POACOMMENT:- accuracy of mortar fire as anti-aircraft artillery is doubtful.

BRIEFS

NOTES FROM IWO JIMA

BAZOOKA fire against our tanks has been reported to have been used by the Japanese on IWO JIMA. POACOMMENT:- this fire must be considered to be a result of a new Jap anti-tank weapon, or of captured US bazookas. (SECRET)

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Notes on Enemy Tank and Anti-Tank Tactics on Luzon

(From Hq Sixth Army G-2 Weekly Report No 73, 31 Jan 45)

A combat manual issued by the 2d Armored Division, dated 15 Nov 1944, in obvious preparation for the LUZON campaign has been captured. Pertinent extracts follow:

"This PHILIPPINE battle will end either in the annihilation of the American devils or in the complete destruction of our forces. The decisive day is drawing near..... Emphasis is laid on anti-tank combat, particularly against heavy tanks. Our lack of armament is more than equalled by our divine ability and superior tactics."

(Comment: This rings another change on the familiar Japanese "spiritual-power-is-better-than-fire-power" theme. How effectively "divine ability" is able to compensate for lack of armor protection and fire power may be gathered from the fact that in the largest tank battle to date, at SAN MANUEL on the night of 27-28 Jan, 40 out of a total of 45 Jap tanks (including 41 mediums) destroyed were knocked out by the organic weapons of one of our infantry regiments).

"Stay in trenches and when there are none, use camouflage, remain perfectly still, or crawl very slowly. In this way you will not be discovered by the tanks. Outstanding objects, moving targets and smoke bombs draw the attention of a tank....Our sure-hit (HISSATSU) anti-tank weapons are the Model 90 FA gun and hollow charge explosives. These are most effective at the following ranges:

"Model 90 FA gun - about 500 meters.
"Hollow charge explosive - about 2 meters."

(Comment: The Model 90, 75mm gun, with muzzle brake, is an effective anti-tank weapon, and the Japanese have employed them at much closer point-blank ranges than 500 meters. Several of our M-4's have been knocked out by Jap artillery within 150-200 yards range: a favorite tactic has been to site the pieces along roads, permit our tanks to pass, then fire at their rear. Hollow charge explosives, such as the lunge mine, shoulder pack anti-tank mine, etc, have been used in a few instances, but not effectively.)

---continued next page---

BRIEFS

SECRET WEAPON COMING UP

W/T, 1 January 1945 (In English) "Doctor Hidatsuzu Yagi, now president of the Board of Technology, exhorted the Japanese people to place all our confidence in our scientists who are working ceaselessly and endeavoring to create a new and secret weapon powerful and deadly enough to determine the issue of the war."

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"In contrast with the above, the following weapons will be called ruse tactics weapons (KISAKU KAKI). Utilize terrain features and attack the moving parts of armament to facilitate attacks by the sure-hit (HISSATSU) weapons:

"47mm gun - about 1500 meters (4920 feet)
"37mm gun - about 1000 meters (3280 feet)
"MG - about 300 meters." (984 feet)

(Comment: The 47mm anti-tank gun, Model 1 (1941), has been employed effectively, but at shorter ranges than the above indicated 1500 meters. The Jap 37mm gun and the Jap MGs are not considered effective weapons against our medium tanks. It seems incongruous that the enemy should prescribe use of the 47mm gun and 37mm gun at longer ranges than the more effective Model 90,,75mm gun.)

"Raiding combat will take place at night. Attacks by tanks (including infantry riding on tanks) will be against airfields, warehouses and tents, etc. Attacks by infantry and engineer troops will be against headquarters, artillery, tanks and other mobile targets."

(Comment: The heavy counterattack at SAN MANUEL night of 27-28 January featured Jap infantry riding into combat on the top of tanks. The extreme difficulty of coordinating tank maneuvers at night are obvious, especially in view of the usual lack of radio intercommunication on Jap tanks; yet the enemy persists in employing armor as well as infantry in his nocturnal attacks-- his favorite time for fighting.)

"After the infantry groups have broken through the enemy front lines our concentrated power will smash through to enemy interior positions and destroy enemy CP and main fire power systems, this will be termed, 'main strength combat.' A tank platoon as nucleus, with various branches of service cooperating with infantry groups in raiding attacks is termed a 'tank combat group.'

(Comment: Note that the enemy's conception of "main strength combat" involves the employment of no more than a tank platoon. Nowhere in the manual does the enemy show any appreciation of modern tank doctrine of employment in mass; he is apparently content to dissipate his armored strength in piece-meal attacks involving a few tanks at a time.)

BRIEFS

THE PEN IS MIGHTIER.....

According to a 7th Army October report, 4 tons of psychological warfare material, leaflets, etc., dropped by a Mediterranean Allied Air Force aircraft, scored a direct hit on a German lighter in the Bay of Marseilles, and sank the craft.
(Naval Aviation Conf. Bull., Jan 45) (Confidential)

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Possible Bamboo Robot Bomb

(From 7th Air Force Intelligence Summary No 1,, Vol 2
2 Feb 45)

The Japanese may possibly have in production their version of the German flying or robot bomb, designed to be employed against Allied aircraft, a document captured on LEYTE, PI disclosed. Described as having a framework of bamboo, the Jap robot is admittedly a stop-gap weapon whose use is made mandatory by the pressure of Allied advances, and its manufacture limited by shortages of labor and materials in the Empire.

Arguing that certain types of weapons must be employed at crucial moments in spite of their weak points, the document stresses America's ability to modify and change its equipment and put large quantities of weapons into the field on short notices. The Jap robot bomb is frankly the resort of an enemy keenly aware that there is no time to perfect new basic weapons.

The Jap flying bomb is described in the document as follows:

"It is.... actually a small type of aircraft with a wing span of approximately six meters(20 ft) and fuselage length of about five meters (16 ft), whose flight path is automatically controlled; its explosive charge is in its nose section.

"In flight, whether launched from an aircraft or a ground position, the rudder is actuated by a direction control mechanism while at the same time altitude is maintained through use of an 'up-down' selector device. Its speed ranges from 260 to 300 (TN: Unit not stated believed to be meters) per second. (Approx 1000 feet per second).

"Once the general direction is attained by the regular course control device, a sonic control device takes over, which accurately directs the robomb to the target (an aircraft or formation). Upon impact, the entire bomb is destroyed and secrecy concerning it is thus maintained. (TN: It appears from other references that there is a special detonator for destroying the actuating mechanism).

"Particulars and advantages: The framework is constructed of bamboo and other wood. The cost of manufacture is low and the robomb is feasible for mass production. It can easily be launched from a ground position, aircraft or ship. Firing or launching operation is relatively simple."

The robomb has a climb and descent selector mechanism, a mechanism to equalize deflective effects of atmospheric currents and anti-aircraft shell fire, thus maintaining the fuselage in a horizontal position; a device that keeps the robomb at 2000 meters (6,560 ft); and a sound detecting system intended to direct the bomb toward aircraft.

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Pearl Harbor on That Day and After

(From South-East ASIA Translation and Interrogation Center, Translation Report No 70)

A detailed account, taken from a Japanese newspaper, based on the recollections of several persons who returned to JAPAN on the second exchange ship TEIA MARU, is here translated in part.

"Overhead, a formation of Boeing B-17s flies past towards WHEELER Field. This is since that day, Dec 8th (HAWAIIAN dating 7th). It is the reinforcements being transported from the mainland of the USA day after day. Military forces whose transport is a military secret, are being moved during the day, because.....On the night of the great PEARL HARBOR attack, at about 8 o'clock, a formation of 19 Boeing B-17s was rushed up as reinforcements from SAN DIEGO. The ground units thought this was another Japanese air raid, and put up a screen of AA fire, shooting down most of them. Then the air formations thought that PEARL HARBOR was already occupied by the Japanese and dropped all their bombs. Ever since this great mishap, air transport is being operated by day only.

"As though chased to cover by the shadows of the aircraft, my wife and I went into the cover of the guava trees. We were out of breath on the steep side-road which passes from ALEWA Hill to the PUNCHBOWL, hoping to stop and look just for a moment, just one glance at the blue wave-crests of PEARL HARBOR, to offer a silent prayer for those dead heroes who had come out from our fatherland like warriors of the gods. And because we wanted to keep the memory of that successful battle deep in our hearts for a life time. We disregarded the strict security regulations, and although we were forbidden to go out of doors between 6 PM and 8 AM, we once more ascended the heights north of ALEWA. It was in the early morning of the 3d day after the PEARL HARBOR attack and from there the whole area from the beaches of WAIKIKI to the streets of HONOLULU and PEARL HARBOR to the west were visible.

"On the morning of Dec 7, I was enjoying my breakfast tobacco when I heard my son exclaim: "Aeroplanes with the Japanese flag!" Watching the purple smoke rising straight up and disappearing in the sky, which seemed purified by last night's wind and rain, I replied: "Its a maneuver." I guess I wasn't the only one, and the whole population of OAHU would probably have answered in the same vein at that moment. But when we heard a rumbling sound like distant thunder a few minutes later, growing louder and louder, I felt a chill run through my spine.

"I ran to the radio and switched the dial to KGU and then with trembling hands to KGMB. A loud, shaky voice could be heard saying: "PEARL HARBOR is being attacked by JAPAN. It's a real attack." Is this a dream? Since I came to HAWAII, I have always dreamed of such an event every time the unjust American authorities have been oppressive. Watching from the verandah, several aircraft would be seen where dark smoke rose, diving continuously into it. It looked just as if they were all tied together forming a circle in mid-air. With the back-ground of dark green hills and blue skies it was particularly beautiful.

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PEARL HARBOR ON THAT DAY AND AFTER (CONTD)

"Several minutes or hours passed. As the voice over the radio was calling upon doctors and nurses, I realized the gravity of the situation. Unconsciously I began to laugh when they announced special requests for undertakers.

"Confusion in the town seemed tremendous. I tried to telephone a friend, but could get no connection. While we waited anxiously, mid-day came and Mr K. of the Japanese language school came to visit us with extras of the "Advertiser" and "Star Bulletin." In the streets of HONOLULU there were over 10 casualties among Japanese caused by AA shrapnel. Damage to HICKAM, KANEOHE, and FORD Island airfields, and great damage inflicted on warships were successively related.

"The day ended in restlessness. In the night, explosions were heard. My heart beat fast. Could it be the landing of the Japanese? At that time rumors of Japanese paratroop landings and submarines entering the Naval base were current. Days later the penetration of the Japanese submarines was found to be true. The following morning dawned with the sound of Army lorries speeding along. We heard various stories from eye witnesses, among which the most impressive was the noble sight of a Japanese aircraft suicide crash, seen from PACIFIC HEIGHTS by Dr M's son. The aircraft was wingless and inside the burnt fuselage were found members of the crew. They were dead and smeared with oil as if they had tried to protect each other. One of the dead men was grasping his sword tightly. Then the boy said with a look I cannot describe: "They had no parachutes!" We felt the sublime spirit of the Japanese soldier and could not restrain our tears.

"Hearing rumors that they were investigating a special Japanese U-boat at the harbor, and that they had also started to collect casualties from the greatly damaged warships, my wife and I climbed up ALEWA Hill the following morning (10th). WHEELER Field could not be seen as KALIHI Hill obstructed the view, but thin smoke was still rising. At PEARL HARBOR, over there until four days ago the US Pacific Fleet was anchored. Where are they now? It is not the result of a sortie. Look, there they are, the pitiable ruins of a warship, showing the leaning foremast above the surface of the water. There were only a few small ships working with nets stretched to and fro across the harbor.

"At the entrance of the harbor a splash went up. The destroyer-like warship must have dropped a depth charge. Soon a dull sound was heard. The surrounding scenery showed no trace of the great battle which 2 days ago had shaken the whole world. I was filled with emotion when my wife said: "Under those waters" and sobbed. I watched startled, hiding behind a guava trunk, and PEARL HARBOR became blurred with tears. Unconsciously we had kneeled on the ground and were holding each others hands tightly. As autumnal leaves on trees we became pale and trembled. We, as Japanese, had worshiped something most sacred.

(Related by Mr M., Public Works Contractor.)

[redacted]

The Weather Problem in Attacking Japan

(From IMPACT, Vol 3, No. 2, Feb 1945)

Forecasting the weather over JAPAN and along the 1300-mile route from the MARIANAS to JAPAN is considered so important by the XXI Bomber Command that from its base on SAIPAN it schedules three "Weather Strike Missions" daily. Primarily, these B-29 missions obtain weather data over JAPAN. Secondarily, bombs are dropped - just to make the trip even more worth-while. The Japs call them "nuisance raids." Actually, they are much more than that. For this weather information helps to determine when and where the bulk of our bombs will fall.

A long-term strategic bombing campaign requires, however, more than a day-by-day weather report. It requires a knowledge of the seasonal weather pattern that prevails generally over the entire area to be bombed.

In the winter, a flow of cold air sweeps across the entire length of the Japanese island chain from generally north to generally south. Such an airflow results from the accumulation of a great mass of cold air over the icy interior of SIBERIA - an air mass whose principal escape route is towards the southeast across the main Japanese islands. This initially cold, dry Siberian air picks up considerable heat and moisture over the Sea of Japan. By the time it has reached the JAPAN coast, it yields cloud and precipitation on the windy northwestern slopes where it is lifted. Targets along this cloudy coast are not recommended for winter bombing.

Then this far-traveling Siberian air, dried in its ascent over the mountain backbone of the islands, and warmed in its descent on the other side, arrives clear and dry over the plains that face the PACIFIC. Consequently, these areas are characterized by clear skies. This weather situation is particularly favorable for bombing the important target areas in the southeastern coastal plains of HONSHU and KYUSHU, including TOKYO and NAGOYA.

As this same cold air sweeps out across the PACIFIC, towards GUAM, it underruns warm, tropical air and produces a turbulent frontal area with towering clouds. Bombers flying from the MARIANAS to TOKYO must penetrate these fronts on their routes.

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BRIEFS

HIGH VELOCITY ARTY ON IWO

Throughout the afternoon of 24 Feb 45, the area south of MOTOYAMA airfield was subjected to intermittent high velocity artillery fire. POACOMMENT:- the possible use of anti-aircraft guns for ground fire is suggested. (SECRET)

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THE WEATHER PROBLEM IN ATTACKING JAPAN (CONTD)

While in winter there is a high probability of clear weather over targets near TOKYO, there is no certainty of it. A listing of weather conditions reported on the first eleven big-scale bombing missions to TOKYO and NAGOYA, executed in the early winter, shows that weather problems exist even in this most propitious season.

24 Nov - TOKYO. No clouds to 9/10 undercast.
27 Nov - TOKYO. Jap mainland completely cloud-covered.
29 Nov - TOKYO. Solid undercast at target.
3 Dec - TOKYO. Clear with excellent visibility.
13 Dec - NAGOYA. 1/10 clouds.
18 Dec - NAGOYA. 3 squadrons reported CAVU directly over target. 6 squadrons reported 8/10 to 10/10 clouds.
22 Dec - NAGOYA. 6/10 to 10/10 clouds.
27 Dec - TOKYO. 1/10 clouds. Excellent visibility.
3 Jan - NAGOYA. Primary target CAVU to 2/10 clouds.
9 Jan - TOKYO. Primary target CAVU.
14 Jan - NAGOYA. Primary target 8/10 to 10/10 clouds.

Strong winds and icing, typical of any high altitude winter flight, are reported frequently. On 3 December, for example, a 200-mile-an-hour wind swept over the target at an altitude of 29,000 to 31,000 feet. On another mission one B-29 landed home with only 80 gallons of gas, having used too much gas from the IP to the target because of winds. Also, its rear bomb bay doors would not close for three hours after bombing due to bad icing. Others reported severe icing on the astrohatch after one hour's continuous flying at 30,000 feet and the loss of 25 mph due to rime icing.

In the summer, the cloud cover shifts to the PACIFIC side of the Japanese islands, leaving a new set of targets exposed on the northwestern coast. Here a weak flow of cool air circulates over the sea of JAPAN. This air converges along the lower edge of the cloud area, with a strong flow of warm air from the PACIFIC. A sheet of clouds is then formed on the warm air as it ascends over the wedge of cold air. Where the warm air climbs the mountain backbone of JAPAN, clouds build up to great heights. These high clouds, and the rains that fall from them, are restricted to the southeastern side of the mountains, affording a protective summer blanket for such targets as TOKYO, while clear skies prevail on the northwest. JAPAN may be likened to a man in bed who pulls up the blanket to keep his ears hidden, only to expose his toes.

BRIEFS

JAP LUNGE MINE

The enemy has been using lunge mines on LUZON and in MANILA. A half-dozen enemy have been killed, with lunge mines in their hands. POACOMMENT:- These constitute actual instances of the use of this A/T mine reported in detail in USAFPOA, G-2 Bulletin No 10, 19 Feb 45. (SWPA Daily Intelsum #1052, 11/12 Feb) (SECRET)

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Specially Fitted Suicide Planes

(From Hq, Allied Air Forces, SWPA Intelligence Summary
No 254, 14 Jan 1945)

Japanese planes are apparently being specially fitted for suicide attacks on our shipping. In a recent attack on one of our naval task forces operating in N PHILIPPINE waters, one such unusual instance was reported.

The plane, a FRANCES, came in fast at 25 feet altitude against a most concentrated and accurate fire from all calibers of anti-aircraft and advanced for approximately 2000 yards before crashing. Apparently, the current practice seems to be for fast planes to come in, flying so low that they leave a wake from their propeller wash, then bank and climb to collide with the ship's superstructure. Generally, the attack is out from the sun, or from a land background with which the plane's camouflage blends. There is a possibility that some suicide planes may be carrier-based since certain of them have been tracked from positions at sea.

The fact that this FRANCES could continue for so long in the face of such terrific odds and such heavy punishment could mean that some planes are specially equipped with more efficient leak-proofing or self-sealing for fuel tanks and heavier armor arranged to provide safety against frontal fire. The crew of the plane when used in a suicide mission is no doubt composed of only the pilot, and from observations such as those made in the above mentioned incident it is credible and logical that engine cowlings and nose section are armored, and that the three previously unprotected leading edge tanks in each wing of the FRANCES are now protected.

Cloth Bag and Booby Trap

(From Hq, Allied Air Forces, SWPA Intelligence Summary
No 254, 14 Jan 1945)

This piece of demolition equipment was found near ORMOC, LEYTE and the method of packing for shipment is unknown as samples recovered were unpacked. No reports have been received of the actual use of this equipment, but it is excellent for booby traps of all types using a pull type igniter fuze and may have been manufactured for that exclusive purpose.


Description:- The colored cloth bag of the demolition equipment is found in white and various shades of pastel blue and pink, and probably other colors not recovered.


The fuze is of the pull type igniter with a short delay which is inserted into the mouth of the bag. It is held in place by wrapping twine around the bag one and one half inches from the mouth of the bag. The bags that were recovered were fuzed so it is presumed that they are shipped ready for use.

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NOTE: -
Booby trap secured to cockpit floor beneath pilot's seat. Fuze pull wire concealed and attached to control stick.

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CLOTH BAG [illegible] BOOBY TRAP (CONTD)

The type of explosive is unknown; no chemical analysis has yet been made; it is,however,a very light, crystal-like powder, tan in color.

Bag data:- The bags are not standard and therefore the data given below is approximate and applies specifically to the one found-

Weight of assembly, fuzed - 8 oz
Overall length of bag - 8 inches
Width of bag - 4¼ inches

Fuze description:- The fuze has a pull type, quick-match igniter, short piece of safety fuze for delay, and a miner's type of detonator. The body of the fuze is not threaded. The main body of the fuze is a hard black substance 1 and 15/16 inches long with rings and grooves for securing the fuze to the bag of explosives.

Two small strips of split bamboo have been added to the fuze, diametrically opposite each other, to reinforce the detonator and prevent it from being broken loose from the main body of the fuze. The bamboo is held in place by three separate wrappings of twine.

Fuze data:-
Overall length - 6 and 1/16 inches
Length of black body - 1 and 15/16 inches

Action:- When rigged for operation, the pull type igniter ignites the delay, which in turn ignites the detonator, which explodes the charge. It takes a light pull only to operate the fuze.

COMMENT:- This piece of equipment is excellent for the booby trapping of planes as it can easily be concealed in remote places of an airplane and can be fired by any movable part of an aircraft that is accessible for attaching the bag.

BRIEFS

MINES ON LUZON

Mines placed in the fields and along the roads in the MANILA area were ceramic land mines. Underneath these mines, however, a naval depth charge was placed. This depth charge is cylindrical, 18 inches in diameter and 3 feet long. We lost 5 tanks on these mines, one of which was blown off the road, turned over and the turret blown 60 feet from the tank. (SWPA Daily Intelsum #1052, 11/12 Feb) (SECRET)


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Jap Conical Grenade

(From ATIS, SWPA Bulletin No. 1707, 18 Jan 45 and Pacific MIRS Weekly Report No. 4, 31 Jan 45)

The document from which the following was extracted was taken at DAGAMI, LEYTE, 6 Nov 1944. It consisted of loose mimeographed plans for training in the use of anti-tank material:-

Type 3. Conical Grenade



Characteristics:- Purpose - to be thrown at tanks in order to destroy the armor plate and kill or wound the crew.

Data: - Diameter of base - about 10 cm (4 in)
Length - about 17 cm (7 in)
Weight of charge - about 600 g (21 oz)
Fuze - instantaneous
Total weight - about 700 g (25 oz)
Throwing distance - about 5 m (16.4 ft)

Power:- It can penetrate bulletproof steel plate 70 mm (2.7 in) or less in thickness, and kill or wound the crew.

Precautions in handling and method of carrying:- In pulling out the safety pin, straighten the bent ends and pull it out by the cord. Since it is very important that the cone and the fuze fit closely against the bursting charge, tie the cord firmly so they do not shake. Be careful not to let water into any part of the fuze. Tie the grenade to your belt with the cord.

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
Obituary of the Jap First Division

(From Hq Sixth Army G-2 Weekly Report No 73, 31 Jan 45)

The following, presented in vivid form is the story of the destruction of the Japanese 1st Division during the ORMOC CORRIDOR phase of the LEYTE campaign. Offering as it does an evaluation of the strengths and weaknesses of one of the "crack" enemy divisions, now defunct, it has obvious value for present and future operations. Sketches included herewith illustrate types of defensive positions encountered.

. . . . . .

The Jap 1st Division, which landed at ORMOC on the 1st and 2d of November, was pushed rapidly to the N to conduct an "all-out offensive" on PINAMOPOAN by 9 November. The Jap 1st Division consisted of the 1st, 49th, 57th Infantry Regiments in addition to the normal complement of artillery, engineers, transportation, reconnaissance and signal units.




Jap Dougouts Under Roots Of Trees Near Jap 1st Div CP

It was the 57th Infantry that first became engaged with elements of the 24th Division on BREAKNECK RIDGE, S of PINAMOPOAN, and it was that same 57th Infantry with which our 128th Infantry became engaged as it relieved elements of the 24th Division. The 57th Infantry had been given the mission of holding and defending N of LIMON while other elements of the Jap 1st Division carried out their "all-out offensive" to the N coast. The 57th conducted a most determined and tenacious defense of BREAKNECK RIDGE from 16 Nov until 12 Dec.

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OBITUARY OF THE JAP FIRST DIVISION (CONTD)

The 49th Infantry was the regiment that carried out the "all-out offensive" to the N coast. Pushing over wooded slopes of HILL 1525 it reached the COLASIAN POINT area on 19 Nov and there it employed one of its battalions for a period of one week, attempting to reach our artillery positions and rear installations, before the battalion was practically annihilated. This "all-out offensive" terminated when the 126th Inf moved into the HILL 1525 area and engaged the 2 remaining battalions of this regiment, forcing one to the W to join the 57th Inf, in the vicinity of BREAKNECK RIDGE, and the others to the SE where it became and remained engaged with elements of the 112th Cavalry.



JAP FOXHOLE
Sitting or standing position.
Diameter of opening just large
enough for a man to get in.


Displaying all of the tenacity for which the Japanese have been so highly lauded, the 3d Battalion of the 49th Inf and elements of the 57th Infantry remained in the area E and NE of LIMON, for 3 weeks after the attack to the N coast had failed, and while in this position maintained a corridor or supply route towards the N coast E of Highway #2 and generally N of LIMON. The forces, long cut off from supply, soon became a hodge-podge of fighting, fanatical Japs. The most inconsistent array of identities obtained during the entire campaign came from this corridor. All 3 infantry regiments, transportation, signal, anti-tank, artillery and field hospital personnel were identified as being in this same area. Because of the wide variety of identities and widely dispersed enemy positions throughout the corridor, it was difficult to determine, at that time, whether the entire Jap division or a straggler assembly point constituted the defense of the corridor. It did indicate, however, that the Japs continued until the very last, to consider the possibility of accomplishing their missions, launching an all-out attack to the N coast, and utilizing every organization within reach to hold the corridor open.

The remaining regiment of this division was sent to the MT PINA area immediately after disembarkation, but it had no sooner arrived at MT PINA, than it was ordered to the LIMON area to assist the 57th Inf. It became diverted from its original mission and threw a battalion, its 2d Bn, against KILAY RIDGE time after time until the battalion was practically annihilated. The 1st Bn did succeed in reaching the 57th Inf and for a short time assisted in the maintenance of the corridor.

(over)

OBITUARY OF THE JAP FIRST DIVISION (CONTD)

The 3d Bn, minus the 10th Co prepared defensive positions on the high ground S of the LEYTE RIVER BRIDGE and offered the initial delay after our forces had crossed the river. In true Japanese fashion, the 10th Co had been left in the MT PINA area to guard the Regimental Colors but by mid-December it became apparent that the colors would be of no value to a regiment that failed to exist so this 10th Co rushed to the assistance of its battalion.



JAP DUGOUT IN BANK ALONG ROAD

Poles were leaned over the openings with a blanket draped over them to keep out the rain. No attempt made to conceal this position. Holes large enough for two or three men have been found.

As we pushed to the S of LEYTE RIVER, General KATAOKA, CG of the 1st Div committed every troop he could lay hands on. First the reconnaissance Regiment; then the FA regiment, fighting as infantry; then the transportation regimeht, engineers and signal, in that order, occupied every possible defensive piece of ground from LEYTE RIVER to Km marker 79 (about 5,000 yards S of LIMON). It was at Km marker 79 that the div CP, defended by approximately 500 haggard, exhausted, defeated troops of the once proud Japanese 1st Div, made its last stand on the 20th and 21st of December. This mob which consisted of every element that the commanding general had been able to re-assemble, threw in the sponge on the night of 21 Dec and fled to the S and W. Although we searched for the remnants for another 14 days, they continued to remain in obscurity.

The Japanese 1st Div was a crack outfit. It was one of JAPAN's finest. It was so named: "TAMA FORCE", its code name, means "Imperial". Organized in JAPAN, with all of its personnel reactivated from TOKYO, it was sent to MANCHURIA in 1937 and took part in the N CHINA campaign in the HOPI SHANSI sector in July of that year. It then moved back to MANCHURIA in the late fall of 1937 where it remained as garrison troops and

OBITUARY OF THE JAP FIRST DIVISION (CONTD)

trained until the fall of 1943. During that time it had a total strength of 29,400 men and was classed as an "A" Type Division. As our advances up the NEW GUINEA coast and in the CENTRAL PACIFIC continued, this crack division was moved to SHANGHAI where it was held as a mobile reserve as an ace-in-the-hole, to be thrown against our landings in either the PHILIPPINE ISLANDS or on the CHINA coast. With our landing on LEYTE, the division was crowded into transports, rushed to MANILA where it was reviewed (aboard ship) by General YAMASHITA, the CG of the 14th Area Army, then rushed to ORMOC.

During 1943 the division had been heavily cadred and battalions from it were sent to SAIPAN and PALAU. When it left SHANGHAI it had approximately 13,000 troops, but only approximately 12,000 of these landed at ORMOC as elements of it remained in LUZON.

This division was well equipped and adequately supplied. It had an organic FA regiment and in this campaign had available to it supporting fire of another medium FA regt. It had tanks and tankettes. Its infantry had been well trained and it lacked none of the tenacious, spiritual determination for which the Jap soldier is so highly lauded. This training was most evident by his selection of, development of and utilization of defensive terrain. These troops did not overlook a single strong defensive position from BREAKNECK RIDGE to Km 79 on Highway #2 and each position was manned with the proper number of weapons and troops to offer the maximum delay. The troops were determined. They had to be dug out of foxholes individually and this determination was further displayed in the commanders by their dogged determination to maintain the corridor to the N coast even after our troops had advanced several thousand yards to the S of the southern end of the corridor. This training was also evident in his counterintelligence measures. No Jap forces previously engaged by this division have been so thoroughly devoid of dogtags or personal identifications. Never before have diaries carried by individual soldiers been so scarce or non-informative; and never have we captured so few field orders, operational sketches and marked maps.

There was also less evidence of the spiritual or "BANZAI" type of warfare which was so prevalent in the divisions of the 18th Army recently engaged at AITAPE, NEW GUINEA. This tends to indicate that the Jap 1st Division carried more faith in the ability of well trained soldiers than in the ability of an untrained spiritually influenced one. It could also indicate a better standard of education among the ranks.


Yet, with all of these characteristics of a crack outfit, the Jap 1st Ind Div took its first and final defeat at the hands of the 32d Division. It is again our privilege to analyze the defeat of the enemy in spite of the difference between the two units as pointed out above, there is a marked similarity in this analysis to the one made in September 1944 on the defeat of the 20th, 41st and 51st Divisions of the Japanese 18th Army, at AITAPE. Again, not-withstanding our own numerical superiority, our superior air, artillery, weapons and equipment; the same fundamental weaknesses in the enemy's tactics appeared here as on the DRINIUMOR.

The apparent inability of subordinate commanders to think for themselves, their inability to be flexible and depart from a predetermined plan to meet a change in their local situation, their lack of coordination and piece-meal efforts, their apparent inability to use artillery effectively, lack of adequate communications facilities, vague and ambiguous orders, inadequate and incorrect maps, and their dishonesty - up and down - all contributed to their inevitable defeat. This division's order to conduct an "all-out attack" to the N coast, was never deviated from,

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until the division had been decimated. General KATAOKA kept his 3 inf regtl Hqs in the corridor E of LIMON until 12 December, 9 days before his division ceased to exist, apparently planning until then to execute this order. A conservative estimate would be that he lost at least one-half of his combat troops in an attempt to get that attack-to-the coast job done. It should have been apparent to him that the American overwhelming strength, applying pressure on all sides prevented any hope of the successful accomplishment of the mission and it only follows sound reasoning that he could have accomplished a more useful purpose by consolidating his forces and conducting a determined defensive pending the arrival of more reinforcements, which were expected and which did arrive (some in the bottom of ORMOC and SANISIDRO BAYS, it is true).



JAP ROAD BLOCK

The most noteworthy example of his dissipation of troops in piecemeal efforts was in the KILAY RIDGE area. We occupied KILAY RIDGE with a battalion. KILAY RIDGE was a bald, open hill and he knew the strength we had on it. Yet with the entire 1st Inf Regt at his disposal he threw away the entire 2d Bn of that regiment in repeated attempts to climb the ridge through our heavy artillery concentrations. The other glaring example was the push to the N coast by the 2d Bn of the 49th Inf. He pushed the battalion through but when it got into hot water he let it stew, rather than assisting its withdrawal with the other 2 battalions of the 49th, which were in that area.

His failure to use his artillery in a coordinated manner is the most glaring deficiency in this engagement. It was used and inflicted considerable casualties and damage on us, but with the entire FA regt, amply supplied with ammunition at the gun positions, he preferred to use this artillery in small-scale harassing fires for counterbattery or against rear installations rather than coordinated preparatory or defensive fires for his inf troops, while huge piles of artillery ammunition, unused, lined Highway #2.

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OBITUARY OF THE JAP FIRST DIVISION (CONTD)

It is considered highly possible that this lack of coordination in both his infantry and artillery regiments was caused by his shortage of communication facilities. An examination of his div CP area on 22 December disclosed that only one telephone circuit ran from the div CP to rear areas. This made an interesting comparison to the number of telephone circuits leading to the rear from one of our infantry or artillery Bn CPs, but would never compare with the telephone circuits leading to the rear from an American Division CP.

Those field orders captured during this engagement mentioned only the offensive; the preparations for and the continuation of the "all-out" attack to the N coast. Not until the very last did they indicate that a defensive was being conducted. It is easy to imagine the consternation of a Regimental Commander whose regiment has been torn to shreds, receiving a field order which directed only the offensive. Propaganda leaflets found in great abundance in Jap tanks in a road block near the 1st Division CP bore the headlines, "US PACIFIC FLEET knocked out; troops in LEYTE are Isolated". This article continued with an explanation of how the Nippon army and Navy were at that time relentlessly sledghammering the enemy into submission. This leaflet, written in MANILA (under the date line of 27 Oct 1944), also reported the details of the destruction of 130 American ships, of various types, during the period 12-26 October, and proudly proclaimed the air supremacy being maintained by the Japs over the PHILIPPINES. Such falsification also originated in the lower commands: the commander of the assault force to COLASIAN POINT reported that he had cut off and was annihilating the enemy in the PINAMOPOAN area. (The same falsehood was repeated in communiques issued by the Japanese High Command.) A patrol leader reported that he "out 500 meters of telephone wire". This same type of incorrectness existed on those maps which were captured. They were generally of the 1:250,000 scale, of terrain which was extremely difficult to picture on a 1:50,000 scale map.

And so it was with the TAMA FORCE, "The Imperials", It must be admitted that General KATAOKA's troops made a most vali nt effort to maintain the superior rating for which they had been named.

BRIEFS

CONCERNING THOSE WOUNDED

"Men who are slightly wounded will participate in this battle. When men are wounded and are not able to participate in this battle, their unit leaders will see to it that they end their own lives." - Operation Order captured SAN MANUEL, LUZON. (ATIS,SWPA Bull #1795, 15 Feb 45.) (Confidential)

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