
N-4398.10 ~~SECRET~~

INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

N-4398.10

UNCLASSIFIED



DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.
DOD DIR 5200.10

G-2

UNCLASSIFIED

USAFPOA

~~SECRET~~

Reproduced by 30th Engr. Base Top. Bn. USAFPOA No. 5423 April 1945

UNCLASSIFIED [redacted]

HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES
PACIFIC OCEAN AREAS
APO 958

UNCLASSIFIED

I N T E L L I G E N C E B U L L E T I N

No 14 - 20 Apr 45

ARTICLES	Page No
Propagandizing the Jap Suicide Sub	1
Japanese Suicide Rocket Aircraft	2
Jap Navy Suicide Crash Boats	5
"Inside Japan"	7
Japanese Armored Tracked Personnel Carrier	8
Saipan Lessons	9
New Suicide Airplane	9
Japs Mould the Chinese	10
Type 99 Mine Thrower	11
Defense Against Flame Thrower Attack	12
Jap Radar Situation	13
French Indo-China Forces	15
Jap Experiments with Hollow Charge Aerial Bombs	17
Psychology Japan	19
Japanese Booby-Trap Igniter	22
Jap Suicide Mission A Failure	23
First Independent Incendiary Company	25
Undercover Liaison	27
Jap Artillery Tactics in the Defense of Iwo Jima	28
Discussion Concerning Japanese Ground Nameplates	33
BRIEFS	
Jap Approach to Psychiatry	6
Jap Rumor	7
Jap Censor on the Job	10
Attacking to the Rear	12
Balloon Aircraft Hazard	13
Japs Claim False Insignia on US Planes	14
The Army Keeps in Touch	15
"Rising Dragon" Fighter Plane	16
Balloon Squadrons?	18
Bacteria on the Jap Mind	18
Desolation at Takao	21
Cannibalism Again	24
Jap Extralegal Punishment	26
Ten-Minute Break	28
Technique of Surrender	29
Old Salts	30
West Coast UX Bomb	31
Transfer in Grade	32

JUN 21 1965

The material contained herein may be reproduced within the limits of security regulations.

Kendall J. Fielder

KENDALL J. FIELDER
Brig Gen, GSC
AC of S, G-2

RECIPIENTS ARE URGENTLY REQUESTED TO NOTIFY THE AC OF S G-2 USAFPOA IF THIS BULLETIN IS NOT DESIRED OR IF COPIES RECEIVED ARE IN EXCESS OF REQUIREMENTS.

NOTE: Material in this Bulletin which is based on PW interrogations should be appraised accordingly.

COVER PAGE: Japanese Suicide Rocket Aircraft captured on OKINAWA. See article on Page 2, and following pages for additional pictures.

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.
DOD DIR 5200.10

UNCLASSIFIED [redacted]

UNCLASSIFIED

[redacted]

UNCLASSIFIED

Propagandizing The Jap Suicide Subs

During the last week in March 1945, Radio Tokyo delivered several eulogistic announcements on the subject of the KAMISHIO Special Attack Corps, or suicide submarine units. The corps is likened to the KAMIKAZE Special Attack Corps, at least insofar as the daring and heroic aspects of each is concerned. When the Jap "KAMI", meaning God or divine, is linked to "SHIO" meaning Salt (or "Sea" by inference), the significance of the name becomes apparent, and is consistent with the evident Jap intent to give wide use to these suicide sub units. The term KAMIKAZE is built in the same fashion, KAZE meaning "Air." Whatever plans may have been made for the KAMISHIO Special Attack Corps, however, disseminating agencies have not stinted in publicizing it. On 24 Mar 45, Radio TOKYO delivered itself of the following description of the Corps:

"In comparison to the soaring KAMIKAZE Special Attack Corps, the special human bullet submarines, also destined to live in tradition, took shape in the form of the KAMISHIO Special Attack Corps. This has been sallying forth from the homeland and carrying out fierce sure-death and sure-hit attacks which have been brought to our knowledge.

"The special submarine employed during the fierce attack on PEARL HARBOR was the brain child of Lt Col IWASA and several other young men. The KAMISHIO Special Attack Corps, likewise, is an idea of Lt NISHINA and his young cohorts. These are instances where the pulsating traditional flow of the spirit of the Special Attack Corps is discernible.

"The special human bullet Submarine Corps, prior to sallying forth on its mission of attack, absolutely denies itself the hope of safe return. It must be specifically realized that true to its name the human bullet submarine corps makes a sure-death, sure-hit attack.

"The crew members of the KIKUSUI Corps and KONGO Corps are demanding of their (superior) officers that the word "Special" be stricken from the designation of "Special Attack Corps." It is most natural for a subject to die for the Emperor's sake; therefore, there is nothing special in attacks carried out by the Corps. The warriors' most cherished honor should, therefore, be in carrying out in devotion the sure-death, sure-hit training.

"The youngest of the trainees should be between the ages of 20 and 25. By propelling the divine salt water, the young heroes, in order to defend the Empire, at the risk of their lives destroyed the enemies and to a great distance subdued the stormy waves of the Pacific and rushed into the midst of the enemy.

" "When we take notice of the continuous exploits of the soaring KAMIKAZE Special Attack Corps, and the violent-tide KAMISHIO Special Attack Corps, and their everlasting war achievements obtained at the expense of their flesh and blood, we must not only believe in the truth of the everlastingly unperishable nature of our country, the land of God, but we must also follow the lead of the youngsters, and the one hundred million of us should in the spirit of special attack serve as a pillar in the defense of our Fatherland."

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

(over)

UNCLASSIFIED

Japanese Suicide Rocket Aircraft

(From XXIV Corps G-2 Summary #4, 12 Apr 45)

The following information is based on a preliminary field examination made by TAI Officers of JICPOA of the type Japanese Suicide Rocket Plane found in dispersal area surrounding KATENA Airstrip, near KATENA, OKINAWA, on 2 April 1945: Evidence indicates that there were at least nineteen (19) of this type aircraft on the KATENA Airfield; three (3) of which were recovered in excellent condition and two (2) in good condition, while fourteen (14) are believed to have been demolished by friendly gunfire and aerial bombardment. Evidence substantiating this belief is that small bits of the aircraft were found in the immediate vicinity of as many bomb craters.

Information obtained from nameplates and fuselage markings of twelve (12) of the aircraft is as follows:

AIRCRAFT NO	FUSELAGE MARKING	MFRS NO	FACTORY
1011	1-07	962	Kayagsaki Plant
1014	*	*	Nippon Aircraft
1022	1-18	*	Fuji Aircraft Company
1030	*	*	Fuji Aircraft Company
1035	*	*	*
1049	*	*	*
1066	*	9124	Nippon Aircraft Company, Limited
1070	1-10	92??	Fuji Aircraft Company
1081	1-13	*	Kayagsaki Plant
1084	*	987	Fuji Aircraft Co & Kayagsaki Plant
*	*	9115	Nippon Aircraft
*	*	9113	Nippon Aircraft

* Denotes missing or obliterated.

Fuselage numbers are black in color and 12 inches high. Located in front of the fuselage number is an insignia described as a pink maple leaf, approximately 12 inches high, with a 1/2 inch red border.

The aircraft carries a permanently-mounted bomb and is propelled by five (5) rockets, three (3) of which are located in the tail end of the fuselage, while one (1) is mounted near the end of each wing. Design of the aircraft indicates that it is intended to be launched from a "Mother Aircraft" and flown to its target by a suicide pilot who maintains direction of flight through manipulation of conventional aircraft control surfaces being aided by simple flight instruments mounted in the cockpit. (NOTE:- CINCPAC-CINCPOA Weekly Intelligence Bulletin Vol 1, No 39, dated 9 April 1945 carried a full page of photographs of a Jap BETTY in flight, carrying a "flying bomb" under its fuselage. This publication also stated that the BETTY was the only Jap aircraft yet reported rigged to carry a flying bomb, and that the sighting of BETTY's therefore should alert CAP and AA gunners to the possibility of attack by this new and dangerous suicide weapon.)

UNCLASSIFIED

[redacted]

JAPANESE SUICIDE ROCKET AIRCRAFT

Overall length of the rocket aircraft is 20'-0". The fuselage is cigar-shaped and grey-green in color. There are five (5) main stringers having a "U-shaped" section, 1-1/2" deep, which extend the full length of the fuselage and are "L-shaped", with legs 1" x 1/2". There are eleven (11) circular-shaped bulkheads, between the base of the bomb and the tail of the fuselage, with an average spacing of 15". The aircraft has a long nose housing the bomb which is coupled to the forward bulkhead by four (4) 3/4" bolts inserted through lugs machined from the aft side of the bomb base plate. Fuselage skin material is an alloy metal, having vertical sections, lap joined and riveted with flush and roundhead rivets. The cockpit which is located just aft of the wing is covered by a bubble-type, transparent plastic canopy employing a quick release device of German design. (Quick release device was not connected for operation.)

The wing has a tapered trailing edge, slightly tapered leading edge and square tips (slightly faired). Wing has a span of 16' 0" and weighs approximately 500 pounds. Wing is of the cantilever type, with dihedral beginning at the fuselage, and is constructed in one piece. The fuselage is notched and sits down on the wing. Wing spars are of a dense hardwood; ribs of 3/8" plywood. Wing skin sheets are of plywood, fabric covered and colored robin egg blue.

Horizontal and vertical stabilizers, elevators, rudders and ailerons are of conventional type, wood framed with plywood skin covered with fabric. The aircraft has square, twin rudders, slightly rounded on top and bottom. Control surfaces are dynamically balanced with weights, and hinge points are located behind the leading edges. A strong bungee cord is attached to each end of the rudder bar, presumably to keep down flutter at high speed and to hold the rudders in a streamlined position. A strong coil spring is mounted in series with the "nose-up" elevator control cables.

The instrument panel in the cockpit mounts the following instruments:

Air speed indicator (graduated from 100 to 600 MPH).
Altimeter.
Compass (pilot type).
Inclinometer (graduated from 0° to 5° incline and from 0° to 25° decline).

Electrical switch for firing the rockets with five positions, namely; OFF, Wings, #1 Fuselage, #2 Fuselage and #3 Fuselage. There is no radio, radar or gun installed, nor is there a space provided for such future installation. The pilot is provided with a 1.020 liter, walk-around oxygen bottle. A speaking tube with a fur-lined ear piece is located in the cockpit, The tube extends to a point on top of the fuselage, just forward of the windshield and slightly to the right, where it terminates in a pull-type disconnect. A ring and post bomb sight is located just forward of the windshield.

The bomb carried as the payload in the subject aircraft is especially designed for this weapon and exhibits qualities well suited for its purpose. It is believed to be the heaviest Japanese bomb recovered to date. Although no actual weights were recorded, it is estimated that the bomb will weigh in excess of 1000 kg (approximately 2400 lbs). Since the bomb is somewhat similar to the Japanese Navy ordinary bomb (800 kg, less its tail section), it is believed that its loading factor may be about the same, i.e. 40%. This loading factor would place the weight of explosive above 1000 lbs.

[redacted]

(over)

UNCLASSIFIED

Five fuses are provided for detonating the bomb. There is a nose fuse and four base fuses. The nose fuse is similar to that used on the 800 kg bomb mentioned above and is air-arming with no provision whereby the pilot can extract the safety wire while in flight. Apparently the wire is attached to a "Mother Aircraft". Two each of two types of base fuses are employed. One type is designed for straight impact while the other is designed for "all-ways" action. The four base fuses may be armed simultaneously by pulling on a cable which extends into the cockpit. The bomb is 68" long by 23-5/8" in diameter. Its overall color is grayish-blue with one green and one tan band painted around the nose. A test detonation of one of these bombs on the surface of a hard clay field caused a crater approximately 15 feet deep and 25 feet in diameter.

It has been estimated that the aircraft might have a speed in excess of 450 MPH due to the high wing loading and small control surfaces. Considering the small size of the plane, and its color, it would be very hard to spot especially during dusk and dawn. It is estimated that the maximum time elapse between spotting and impact would be about 60 seconds.

There are many features which indicate that this aircraft is designed to be launched from a "Mother Aircraft". These features are as follows:

A speaking tube which extends from the cockpit to a point just forward of the windshield and terminates on the top side of the fuselage in a pull-type disconnect.

Heavy rods with turnbuckles are provided for locking control surfaces in neutral position.

Nose fuse is air-arming with no provision whereby the pilot can extract the safety wire while in flight. The arming wire is probably attached to the "Mother Plane".

Walk-around oxygen bottle probably provided to permit pilot to leave "Mother Aircraft" and descend into the suicide aircraft through bomb bay or access door.

The fuselage is of too light construction to withstand the shock of launching by rocket propulsion from a platform or track.

There are no provisions for attaching wheels or skids.

No tracks or launching platforms were found.

A heavy low dolly, with an 18" hydraulic lift, was recovered. This device is probably provided for the purpose of handling the suicide aircraft in connecting it to the "Mother Aircraft".

This report is intended as an aid to identification of the subject aircraft and to aid in initiating necessary intelligence action as soon as possible.

UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

UNCLASSIFIED

ONE MAN PILOTED ROCKET BUZZ-BOMBS CAPTURED ON OKINAWA

Right:-Being towed in its cradle by U.S. Army Truck.





Left:-Mounted on horses, with tail piece and nose nacelle removed.

Right:-Close up of streamlined nose cover, or nacelle.



SECRET

UNCLASSIFIED

ONE MAN PILOTED ROCKET BUZZ-BOMBS CAPTURED ON OKINAWA

UNCLASSIFIED



Left:-View of stern, showing propulsion mechanism, with jet nozzles removed.

Right:-Side view of stern, showing nozzles being removed.



Below:-View of buzz-bombs in field.



UNCLASSIFIED

[redacted]

Jap Navy Suicide Craft Boats

(From Hq Sixth Army G-2 Weekly Report No 79, 14 Mar 45)

Two types of these boats have been found during the current operation, one manned by Army personnel, found in LINGAYEN Gulf area, and one manned by Navy personnel, found on CORREGIDOR. It is with the latter that this discussion deals. (See photographs opposite next page.)

The Navy Suicide Boat is 16 feet 8 inches long and has a beam of 5 feet 8 inches. The hull is plywood construction throughout and is powered by an automotive type, six cylinder, in-line, gasoline engine. The explosive charge is built into the hull of the boat. This last feature is the main difference between the Army and Navy Suicide Boats.

The container for the explosive charge is 11 inches long, 19½ inches wide, 18¼ inches high at the rear, and 12 7/8 inches high at the forward end. On the rear of the container are wells to accommodate two type 93 mine boosters. One of the boosters contained an electric detonator; the other a non-electric detonator with a pull type firing device.

The type 98 explosive charge weighs 640 pounds and is located below the deck forward of the cockpit. The charge can be fired by three methods: 1, electrically on impact; 2, electrically by closing a switch; 3, by use of a pull igniter. It is not known whether there is any delay in the electric and percussion detonators to permit the operator to escape. This does not seem likely.

To render safe:-

1. Open the battery switch in the cockpit.

2. Open the safety switch and firing switch on the cockpit switch board.

(The above steps should be performed from a distance in case of booby traps.)

3. Cut the detonator leads near the detonator and remove the electric detonator. Care must be taken to avoid tripping the pull igniter during steps 1 and 3.

4. Insert a safety pin in the pull igniter located on the rear of the charge case.

5. Cut the pull wire on the igniter if it is NOT under tension. Remove the igniter and detonator. IF THE PULL WIRE IS UNDER TENSION, DO NOT ATTEMPT TO DISMANTLE. DESTROY IN PLACE.

6. Remove the two boosters and destroy the detonators.

[redacted]

(over)

UNCLASSIFIED

JAP NAVY SUICIDE CRASH BOATS (CONTD)

From the disposal point of view, the boat is inherently very dangerous to anyone unfamiliar with the switch and circuit details. It would also be very simple to booby trap either electrically or through the pull igniter.

The boat carries a large charge that would be very effective against ships. The only defense a ship has is, as in the case of the suicide planes, accurate gunfire.

As to the tactics employed by the Japs in their use of these boats, the following information was gained from interrogation of four PW's, belonging to as many different Suicide Crash Boat Units, who know of the existence of four additional units. Each unit normally comprising 150 men, was charged with the maintenance and operation of 30 crash boats. The function was to destroy the enemy by running the speedy small craft, each operated by one man and carrying a contact-detonated explosive charge of from 250 to 300 kgs (551 - 661 lbs) in its bow, head on into Allied vessels. In this tactic, then, the Naval Crash Boat was a little more honestly suicidal in its effect than the Army Liaison Boats with their alleged 12-foot getaway space from the hull of the victim vessel.

The boats of these Naval suicide units were housed in CORREGIDOR tunnels. According to one of the PW's, there were ten of the boats in each of six tunnels 15 meters (49 feet) in from shore just southeast of CAVALRY Point. There were thirty near the north entrance of MALINTA Tunnel. These 30, the PW asserted, required only 15 men and 5 minutes to be moved on their wheel base from the entrance to the shore. And there were other crash boats in other tunnels. For the Japanese this too was a tale of woe. Reported by the prisoners were - 60 of the boats destroyed in the vicinity of MONKEY Point and, on 15 December, 150 of them destroyed in the area west of MALINTA Hill. Moreover, at least one of the units, the HORIUCHI, lost all of its boats and its organizing officers when the transport which carried them was sunk by an Allied submarine off the PHILIPPINES.

In this area, no instance of the effective use of so much as one of the boats has been reported to date as a reward to the Jap for the pains he took to train these units at the SASEBO Naval Base in the fall of 1944 and to set them up on CORREGIDOR. The concentration of the units in the tunnels of the ROCK suggests again a long-range enemy preparation for "an expected (amphibious) frontal attack on MANILA" and for denying the Allies the use of the Bay.

BRIEFS


JAP APPROACH TO PSYCHIATRY

Jap PW delivered the following sidelight:- "Then, discussing psychiatric cases in the Japanese Army, PW commented on the fact that the Japanese just 'don't bother with such. No soldier,' he continued, 'is normal when shells burst around him at the front; and the fact that he doesn't act normally doesn't mean he is a psychiatric case.'" (WD, MIS, Capt. P&M Branch Report, 23 Feb, 45) (SECRET)

UNCLASSIFIED

NAVAL SUICIDE CRASH BOATS

UNCLASSIFIED



CORREGIDOR TUNNEL IN
WHICH BOATS WERE STORED



BOATS IN TUNNEL FROM
WHICH THEY WERE TO BE
LAUNCHED



BOATS ON BEACH AT
CORREGIDOR



BULKHEAD CONTAINING
EXPLOSIVE CHARGE

UNCLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

[redacted] UNCLASSIFIED

"Inside Japan

(From Hq Sixth Army G-2 Weekly Report No 79, 14 Mar 45)

The following significant opinions on the Japanese internal situation were expressed by a PW, a 2d Class Petty Officer, who left JAPAN in Oct 44. While the usual cautions regarding PW statements should be observed, an accumulation of statements of the sort given here could point towards the possibility of an ultimate crumbling of the fanatical Jap will to fight.

PW volunteered the suggestion that if the next major operation were a landing at or near KASUMIGAURA (north of TOKYO), there would not be any insurmountable opposition; for, the heavy defense installations were massed around the southern part of the Empire. But he thought more important still, was the growing disaffection of the country people far away from the metropolitan areas, and the overwhelming desire of those people for the end of the war. The inevitable victory of the US would be preferable to the ruinous military dominance of the last few years. He said that even in TOKYO there were a great many who covertly admitted that the people were disillusioned beyond believing any official utterance. So much was this so, that the idea that prisoners could not return home after the war was being gradually dissipated as "just one more relic of ancient lore", all of which was beginning to be regarded as pernicious by a substantial but unorganized mass of people throughout the Empire.

PW appeared to be genuinely eager to hear of a landing in this KASUMIGAURA District as a sure sign that the war would soon be "cleaned up and put away" to the benefit of all hands.

He also said that it would be typical Army clique policy to usher in a Naval officers' cabinet in time to saddle it with a fictitious responsibility for JAPAN's defeat. It was therefore important, in his opinion, for the victors to insure the complete discredit of the Army managers even more thoroughly than the Navy people. The Army had been traditionally narrow-minded, and had really blasphemed against the Emperor's majesty with false advice and assumption of strangulating power.

He was insistent that well calculated propaganda leaflets would be effective in JAPAN from now on.

POACOMMENT: - While PW's comments about Army-Navy friction may be tinctured by the fact that he himself is a Navy man, such an idea is not without foundation. Attention is called to the recent appointment of Admiral SUZUKI as Premier, and to the BRIEF, "JAP RUMOR", printed below.

BRIEFS

JAP RUMOR

Jap PW captured in the PHILIPPINES stated that: "...there was constant friction between Army and Navy commands. The Navy would not fully cooperate with the Army, because the Navy had not wanted JAPAN to start the war in Dec 41." PW heard while on KENYA MARU, in Sep 44, that the Navy wished to sue for peace, but the Army would not agree. (SWPA, ATIS, Interr Report No 649, 22 Mar 45) (CONFIDENTIAL)

[redacted] UNCLASSIFIED

(over)

Japanese Armored Tracked Personnel Carrier

(From Hq, Sixth Army G-2 Weekly Report No. 79, 14 Mar 45)

Unknown before our return to the PHILIPPINES, several of these vehicles have since been captured by U.S. forces. One was recovered on LEYTE and at least four have been found in I Corps area, LUZON, P.I.

The vehicle is full tracked, armored, and powered by a six cylinder air-cooled Diesel engine. There may be some slight difference of models, as one is reported to have ¼-inch armor throughout, while another is reported to have ½-inch armor on the front with 1/8-inch armor on the sides and rear. The suspension is similar to that of the type 95 light tank, and the bogie wheels are apparently identical. However, the track on the personnel carrier is both longer and wider than on the light tank. The vehicle will seat approximately 24 men. As the body is much lighter than that of the light tank, it seems probable that the carrier can haul 2 to 3 tons of cargo, if so desired. Maximum speed is reported as approximately 35 miles per hour.

The vehicle is 15 feet 9 inches long overall and 6 feet 8 inches wide. It is armored on all sides and the rear, but is open on top, except for a small armored section over the driver's compartment. Bows are provided to allow a canvas top to be used on the vehicle. There are doors at the rear of the vehicle, and a door on each side, allowing personnel to leave the carrier with ease and rapidity. Metal windshields are provided at the front and sides for the driver, and small vision slits are provided for driving under fire.

The driver's compartment is on the left front of the body and accommodates only the driver. The engine is at the right front of the body, directly opposite the driver. The vehicle is provided with a spring mounted towing pintle, and may be used as a prime mover. There is a mount for a 7.7mm MG on the left front of the driver's compartment.

The engine is a six cylinder, in-line, valve in head, air cooled Diesel, of a type similar to those used in light tanks and the combination prime mover and wrecker. A 24-volt electrical system is used. There are two fuel tanks with an estimated total capacity of 50 to 60 gallons.

The track is driven from the rear. A clutch and brake steering system is used. The transmission is provided with four speeds forward and one in reverse. A high and low range transfer case is also provided.


The tracks and suspension are of the conventional Japanese design, using paired bogie whells and a steel, centerguide track. The four bogie wheels are mounted on two bogies, and are sprung by horizontal coil springs. However, the springs and spring mechanism are enclosed within the body armor, and only the bogie arms are exposed. There are three track return rollers.

This vehicle should be much lighter than the type 95 light tank, but has roughly the same track area in contact with the ground, and uses a motor of similar power; therefore, the cross-country performance of this vehicle should be exceptionally good. The addition of the transfer case should greatly increase the range and power as compared with the light tank. This is borne out by combat troops who have found these vehicles to be highly satisfactory artillery prime movers.

JAPANESE
ARMORED PERSONNEL CARRIER


UNCLASSIFIED

(Recovered in I Corps Area, Luzon, P. I.)



Right Front View

Right Side View





Left Rear View

UNCLASSIFIED

RESTRICTED

[redacted]

UNCLASSIFIED

Saipan Lessons

(From SWPA, ATIS Enemy Publications No 328, 5 Mar 45)

A mimeographed document captured at LEYTE, 20-27 Oct 44 constitutes a combat lessons report and is entitled "Lessons from the SAIPAN Operations." It was issued 12 Oct 44 by I 6551 Force (16 Div Hq). Following are extracts of interesting items.

Dispatch from SAIPAN, 3 July reads, "Only thoroughly trained troops can be expected to withstand resolutely the fierce enemy shellings and bombings..... It is regrettable that very many of the troops now scatter and get out of hand in these situations.

"On SAIPAN the basic strength at our key positions consisted of either one platoon or one company..." "There was an average concentration of one man for every 12 to 15 m (39-59 ft) over the area where the enemy landed.

"... if we persist in employing the inflexible and stereotyped methods used up to now, the enemy will have the upper hand."

[redacted]

* * * *

[redacted]

New Suicide Airplane

(From CHUNGKING Radio CBX 35320, 072020Z Apr 45)

Not volunteers but detailed to duty are the pilots of a new model suicide aircraft being manufactured at LANTIEN CHANG Airfield, PEIPING. Called "V-1," this plane is reported to have shipping as its primary target and to operate from Jap carriers.

This plane is powered by a 450 horsepower engine located in back of the pilot. It carries detonators in the wings and spinner, with 500 to 2000 pounds of explosives located in the nose. It is not equipped with any armament, instruments or parachutes. There are small differences between each individual plane but generally it resembles a P-51 in appearance and a TOJO in size. These planes drop their landing gear when airborne, and follow formations of fighters to their target.

UNCLASSIFIED

[redacted]

(over)

[redacted] ASSIFIED

Japs Mould The Chinese

(From SWPA, ATIS Bulletin No 1862, 15 March 45)

The following are extracts from a bound mimeographed booklet, entitled "Outline of Policy Towards Chinese Living Abroad, Attendant Upon Philippine Independence," dated 13 August 43 to Sept 43, issued by the Philippine Inspectorate of Military Administration.

"Activity by Chinese living abroad will be urged and they will be made to assist in our Great East Asia War.

"The Chinese will be made to come under the guidance of the Military Administration, and after independence is granted, they will be made to cooperate with the New Philippine Government in all areas. Development of relationships between the Chinese and the CHUNGKING political powers will be prevented. Control of these Chinese after Philippine independence is granted will be in the hands of the Philippine Government under our guidance. However, as circumstances require, the Imperial Government itself will carry out such control. Chinese resisting the Japanese will be suppressed.

"The economic functions of the Chinese will be to take part in the establishment of the new Philippine economy and to take as great a part as possible in industrial work.

"The property of the Chinese which has been frozen for resisting the Japanese, or which has been used by the army, will be returned to the owners, except for such property as is of importance to our operations. This excepts property of Chinese being punished for resisting the Japanese. When property cannot be returned for some special reason, compensation will be considered.

"The reopening of Chinese elementary schools will be allowed, with the understanding that the education will be based upon that of the Philippine elementary schools. They will be under our guidance for the time being."

BRIEFS

JAP CENSOR ON THE JOB

A sample excision from mail leaving the PHILIPPINES follows: (July report on Postal Censorship captured at PALO Beach, LEYTE). "On 10 July, the Japanese troops gathered all the men and boys at the church and questioned those connected with the guerrilla unit. They had them drink water and hit them on the cheeks. It was pitiful, and I couldn't watch. They also shot them or speared them to death with bamboo lances. Indeed the Japanese Army does extreme things." (SWPA, ATIS Bul No 1862, 15 March 45) (CONFIDENTIAL)

[redacted]


[redacted]

CLASSIFIE

Type 99 Mine Thrower

(From SINTIC Report No 0110, 13 Mar 45)

The Type 99 Mine Thrower is a crudely made weapon consisting of a base-plate, a hollow tube, and a box-like frame for the projectile. One end of the tube is attached to the base-plate by a hinge-joint to allow aiming. Around the other end of the tube is attached a box-like frame which holds the projectile over the upper end of the tube. Both ends of the tube are open.



Characteristics:-

Width of base plate	16 inches
Length of box-like frame	12 inches
Height of box-like frame	4 inches
Diameter of tube	3 inches
Elevation	40 to 90 degrees

(Original interrogator's report was not clear on this point)

Loading:- A fuze with an attached cord is inserted into the upper end of the tube. The cord runs through the center rod and is used to fire the weapon. A propellant charge of 600 grams (21.2 oz) is inserted on top of the fuze.

Projectile:- The projectile is a metal box filled with yellow dynamite, which fits snugly into the box-like frame around the upper end of the tube. The part of the metal box which fits directly over the opening is heavily padded to prevent the propellant charge from setting off the dynamite inside the box. The projectile has an armed fuze and explodes upon concussion.

UNCLASSIFIED

[redacted]

(over)

UNCLASSIFIED

Defense Against Flame Thrower Attack

(From SWPA, ATIS Bulletin No 1882, 19 Mar 45)

Following is a complete translation of a mimeographed loose sheet containing SHIMBU Staff Memorandum, dated 30 January 1945. The document was captured at MANILA, LUZON on 8 February and concerns the defense of key positions from flame thrower attacks.

"It is thought that in the future the enemy will carry out large-scale attacks with flame-throwers.

"You are hereby notified that it is especially desired that counter-measures be immediately devised with regard to the following points: Study the various methods of flame-throwing by flame-throwing tanks, methods of incendiary spraying with gasoline and other inflammable oils, and also naturally incendiary bombing and shelling attacks. Counter-measures must be taken, and it is absolutely vital that all counter-measures against incendiary spraying particularly be speedily completed, as our Army frequently makes use of wooded areas.

"In order to avoid the burning of our military supply dumps, they must be even more dispersed than at present. Thorough measures must be taken to prevent the spread of the flames.

"Fire control applicable to various positions in the field must be given redoubled attention and ensured. The handling of fire and smoke within caves must be perfected.

"When a grassy spot within a wooded or jungle area is used, easily inflammable dead leaves, grass, low branches, etc., must be cleared away insofar as concealment will not be impaired.

BRIEFS

ATTACKING TO THE REAR

A Jap PW 1st Lt, CO of a MANILA MG Company stated that as of 20 Feb only 40 men remained of his company. PW divided them into two sections and ordered them on a "raid" which he felt should have been interpreted by his men actually as an order to make an attempt towards escape, although such a chance was apparently slim. PW states a direct order to cease fighting and try to escape annihilation is never given in the Japanese Army. (Hq VI Army G-2 Rpt #79, 14 Mar 45) (CONFIDENTIAL)

UNCLASSIFIED

[redacted]

UNCLASSIFIED

Jap Radar Situation

(From Hq XXI BomCom 24 Feb 45, subject: Summary of the Japanese Radar Situation as Indicated by XXI Bomber Command Searches.)

Early Warning Radar: A complete chain of early warning radars exists all along the southern coast of JAPAN. Where formerly relatively few radars looked on a formation, it is now apparent that the courses of our aircraft are being plotted continuously by these equipments. Weather strike missions conducted during night hours have shown that Japanese use of their early warning system does not follow our procedure; that is, the equipment is not kept in continuous operation but is turned on only when an attack is suspected or for regular operating schedules. This has been proven to be the case on a few of our night strike missions, where the enemy radars were turned on after the area had actually been bombed. Another Japanese technique of their early warning radar defense is to operate them in pairs; that is , one radar looks on aircraft while the other continues searching. This latter tactic is a very good method of preventing surprise by diversionary aircraft approaching from different directions.

Gunlaying Radars:- The Japanese antiaircraft gun system has thus far been unsuccessful. That radar is employed by them for gunlaying is known but it does not appear to be a general rule. This may be due to a shortage of such equipment although a total of 12 gunlaying radar installations have been photographed in the TOKYO area and 2 in the OKINAWA district. No signals of the German Wurzburg frequencies have been intercepted, but it is known that the Japanese have received technical information from the Germans and may have secured a number of equipments. The Japanese use of the centimeter wavelength gunlaying AA radar has not yet been determined. The gunlaying equipment is apparently accurate for ranging but inaccurate for azimuth determination. However, this cannot be determined for certain because this fault may also lie in the gun itself, or in the gun crews. The flak bursts against our formations have been in many cases coincident to strong radar signals operating within 195, 220 and 75 megacycles.

Searchlight: Searchlight control radars are in use by the Japanese but these are believed to be few in number inasmuch as they are not used at all times against our weather strike aircraft. This may be due, however, to the apparent reluctance of the Japanese to employ radar during night hours or against a single aircraft. A captured enemy searchlight at SAIPAN revealed the use of a radar similar to our SCR-268. This equipment operates on a frequency of 200 megacycles. Signals having the same characteristics as the SCR-268 have been intercepted over JAPAN. It is possible that other equipment is being used by themat this time, and it may well be that their searchlight equipment is the same equipment that is used for gunlaying.

--- continued next page ---

BRIEFS

BALLOON AIRCRAFT HAZARD

U.S. aircraft raiding JAPAN encountered five free white balloons about two feet in diameter ascending over TOKYO. Each carried a rectangular black object. At formation's level three of these exploded, and the two others at 35,000-40,000 feet. The explosions were in an upward direction and exhuded white smoke. (XX AF Mission Report, 5 Mar 45) (SECRET)

[redacted]

(over)

UNCLASSIFIED

JAP RADAR SITUATION (CONTD)

Enemy Fighter Activity:- The Japanese night fighter defense is believed to be only in an experimental stage. This is indicated by the fact that our weather strike missions have been unmolested by such up to the present time. As excellent opportunity for them to develop such equipment is being provided by these weather strike missions, it may well be that it will appear soon. During a daylight strike by a B-29 in which an RCM observer was searching the enemy radar spectrum, it was noticed that a strong 185 megacycle signal seemed to radiate from an Irving aircraft. The action of the signal appeared to follow the action of the aircraft; that is, as the Irving aircraft approached the signal became stronger and decreased when the Irving withdrew. Night fighters are, of course, dependent on a good ground control interception radar system; that such a system exists is not known because of the lack of night fighters interceptions. The intercepted enemy conversations indicate that they are dependent on early warning radar and visual lookouts for interception for our daylight formations. However, signals indicate that such radars may be in use because of their characteristics. These signals operate on the frequency of about 150 megacycles.

Enemy communications System:- Little is known of the Japanese communications network and its operating effectiveness. Although recordings have been made of enemy voice transmissions on many frequencies, it has not been ascertained which channel is employed for tactical air-to-air and air-to-ground communications. It has been indicated that frequencies between 4400 to 4900 kcs are employed for ground-to-air transmissions but whether these channels are universal for tower to fighter control is not yet known.

Conclusions:- Although much remains to be known about the Japanese radar system, it is believed to be inferior according to our standards and may be compared to our standard of radar defense during the early years of the war. The techniques of rendering the known Japanese radar defense system ineffective are known to us and steps can be taken within a short time to do so, should it become advantageous. Continuous search should be maintained to learn more of their techniques and equipment, and the result of the searches should be analyzed to denote the effectiveness of the Japanese radar system. Searches should be conducted by strike aircraft during XXI Bomber Command strike missions, and by "Ferret" aircraft attached to the Command.

BRIEFS

JAPS CLAIM FALSE INSIGNIA ON US PLANES

"Four American airplanes which bombed WANPIAU, LINSIANG-HSIEN, HUPEH Province on 22 Aug bore the insignia of the red roundel," so read an item in the NAO Group Intelligence Record issued 9 Sept 44, captured at TANAUAN, 29 Oct 44.
(SWPA, ATIS, Enemy Publications No 338, 27 Mar 45)
(CONFIDENTIAL)

[redacted]

French Indo-China Forces

(From WD MID JOB Bulletin No 109, 21 Mar 45)

On 9 Mar 45, the Japanese took over the civil and military machinery of FRENCH INDO-CHINA and began to disarm the French Indo-Chinese forces. These actions culminated nearly five years of gradual encroachment during which the Japanese had accomplished substantial political and diplomatic successes. They had obtained permission to station 5,000 troops in TONKIN Province shortly after Admiral Decoux replaced Jean Catroux as Governor-General in July 1940. They secured a military agreement in 1941 which by the territory south of the 15th parallel was to constitute a Japanese zone of defense, while the French were to defend the territory north of the parallel. The Japanese also acted as arbiters in the THAILAND-FRENCH INDO-CHINA dispute in which the former, in March 1941, reacquired territory in CAMBODIA and LAOS Provinces. They also gradually forced the French from the immediate vicinity of HANOI and HAIPHONG, after an unsuccessful attempt, in 1942, to obtain permission to control the area northeast of LANGSON.

Despite these activities, however, the present action represents a reversal of policy, since the Japanese had previously respected the forms of French sovereignty and had made maximum use of the French local administrative system.

When the Japanese began to disarm the French Indo-Chinese forces, those forces were estimated to number 50,000 French and native troops of which the majority (38,000) were native Annamese under the command of French officers. The Foreign Legion and Colonial Infantry were composed of French, Europeans and Eurasians, the artillery, engineers and mixed infantry of French and native troops.

The preponderance of French Indo-Chinese troops were located in TONKIN Province. Substantially all of these troops were included in the TONKIN Division. This concentration was permitted by the Japanese because it relieved the Japanese from the necessity of garrisoning that area and it served to keep French forces from observing or interfering with the major Japanese activities in COCHIN-CHINA.

Approximately 15,000 troops, principally the COCHIN-CHINA-CAMBODIA Division, were scattered through CAMBODIA and COCHIN-CHINA Provinces, while an estimated 3,000 (the LAOS/ANNAM Brigade) were garrisoned in the central part of the country. The vast areas without

---- continued next page ----

BRIEFS

THE ARMY KEEPS IN TOUCH

"It is expected by the (Japanese) Army that the ex-servicemen who have changed their permanent address because of damage caused by the recent air raids will make an entry of (Branch of Service) date drafted, grades and ranks, full name, date of birth, permanent address and present residing address on the proper papers and submit them soon to the head of the town, city or village by addressing them to the regimental commander of their permanent address." (Radio Tokyo, Jap Home Service, Sunday 1 Apr 45) (UNCLASSIFIED)

[redacted]

(over)

military installations are explained by the fact that 80% of the population occupies about 13% of the area of the country, the remainder being almost uninhabitable because of the prevalence of virulent types of malaria.

The French policy in the time of peace was to have numerous small garrisons throughout the country. As a result, large-scale training and maneuvers were prevented and the Japanese were able to disarm the small detachments when it became expedient.

As indicated above, the French forces were responsible for the defense of the territory north of the 15th parallel. Although there are no trench systems on the Chinese frontier, permanent defenses were built outside of towns located back from the border. Of these towns, LANGSON was the most important. The Japanese, after forcing the French from the vicinity of HANOI and HAIPHONG, are now in complete control of both cities, having disarmed all French forces garrisoned there except those which escaped to the hills. They have also lately reinforced the Japanese detachments stationed a few miles behind the French frontier garrisons.

Auxiliary Troops, sometimes referred to as "Japan Locaux," are Annamites wearing Japanese uniforms. There is considerable evidence that they were conscripted by the French authorities through the local administrative system at the request of the Japanese, and it is presumed that the recruits were then turned over to the Japanese to train. They have been variously reported to number from 20,000 to 500,000 but it is estimated that 100,000 would be the maximum number the Japanese could train and arm in the defense of FRENCH INDO-CHINA. Annamite auxiliary troops were supposedly conscripted for rear area duty. They probably are used, however, as all other auxiliary troops: that is, in whatever capacity the individual Japanese commander chooses to use them, as combat troops, air ground force personnel, garrison troops, or laborers.

Hostilities between THAILAND and FRENCH INDO-CHINA in 1940-41 and the Japanese ultimatum of 9 Mar 45 proved the ineffectiveness of the French forces. Only the detachments located in the remote hills are offering more than token resistance to the Japanese. The failure of any concerted resistance to materialize appears to be caused primarily by:

1. The scattered disposition of the French Troops.
2. The insufficiency of their equipment.
3. The lack of staff experience or training maneuvers on any level higher than a battalion level since 1940.
4. The fact that over 30% of the French and Europeans in the armed forces are over 40 years of age and have suffered the debilitating effects of the FRENCH INDO-CHINA climate for several years.

BRIEFS

"RISING DRAGON" FIGHTER PLANE

In reporting interception of a B-29 raid over TOKYO, Radio Tokyo mentions the recently announced Jap Fighter plane: "It is two forty-five AM. This is the first report we have received of the downing of an enemy raider. Our squadron commander has thus proved his skill in piloting his 'TORIU' or 'RISING DRAGON' fighter plane. (Radio Tokyo, in Italian, 3 Apr 45) (UNCLASSIFIED)

[redacted]

Jap Experiments With Hollow Charge Aerial Bombs

A record of Jap experiments with bombs employing the "shaped charge" principle for air-to-air bombing at night is contained in a document captured in the FT STOTSENBURG area, LUZON and published in ATIS Bulletin #1894. This document is entitled "Report on Research and Experience in the Use of Hollow Charge Bombs in Night Attacks". It was issued by HIDACHI Operational Training (KYODO) Flying Brigade, dated 30 June 1944.

It would seem that any advantage in the use of "hollow charge" bombs against aircraft over bombs containing an ordinary HE charge is questionable, even if the direct hits which would be required to achieve the shaped charge destructive effect could be secured. In spite of previous experience with air-to-air phosphorous bombs, paragraph 3 of this document indicates that direct hits with this bomb are expected.

A reproduction of the document as published by ATIS follows:

1. Evaluation:

   It is recognized that hollow charge bombs can be used at night in exactly the same way they are used in daytime. However, inasmuch as it is difficult to judge the enemy's altitude and path of attack at night, it is essential to adopt a method whereby the enemy's direction of attack and especially his altitude can be reported to the airplane effecting the hollow charge attack. This must be done without losing sight of the enemy airplane.

2. Outline of research and experience:

   A. The target plane and its movements.

      An army reconnaissance target plane drags a 5 m tow target behind it at the end of a 600 m rope.

      Speed of target 200 km. (presumably per hr)

      Altitude 1000 m.

   B. Attack plane.

      (1) Effected under the same conditions as in daylight.

      (2) Air alert - Altitude 1,700.

      (3) Descent:

      Velocity - 260 km. (presumably per hr)
      Angle of descent - 25°.
      Altitude of bomb release - 300 m.

[redacted]

(over)

UNCLASSIFIED

(4) Fuse time - 4.7 seconds.

Each airplane made two attempts with one bomb each.

(5) For purposes of observation, the bomb used was a time bomb. Although the phenomena of descent particular to the hollow charge bomb should be assessed, they are in general the same as the type used.

3. Results are as follows. If hollow charge bombs had been used, direct hits could be expected even on a large enemy airplane.

Pilot: Maj MUDA

First Run: Elevation - 100, Direction 0.
Horizontal variation - 200.

Second Run: Elevation 0, Direction left 30.
Horizontal variation 0.

Pilot: Capt ARITAKI

First Run: No explosion.

Second Run: Elevation 0, Direction left 30.
Horizontal variation 100.

BRIEFS

BALLOON SQUADRONS?

Between 0117 and 0530, 14 April (ALEUTIAN Time) ATTU radars picked up approximately 17 Jap balloons. Blue fighters made 40 sorties and sighted 14 of the balloons of which 10 were shot down within a 75 miles radius of the island. The balloons were at altitudes of 30 - 37,000 feet. (AAF/POA (Admin) Intell Summary #214, 16-17 April 45) (SECRET)

BRIEFS

BACTERIA ON THE JAP MIND

A document captured at KANTHA- CHAUNG (NYEBON) in Jan 45, entitled "Guide to Interrogation of all Enemy Ranks", mentions poison gas, poison and bacteria as subject on which prisoners should be interrogated, seeking "details of concentration of mines, bacteria and poisonous materials at the air base". (S.E.A.T.I.C. Trans Report No 102, 18 Mar 45) (CONFIDENTIAL)

UNCLASSIFIED

[redacted]

UNCLASSIFIED

Psychology Japan

(From Psychological Warfare Division
Hq. SACSEA, Information Review, No 14)

JAPANESE MORALE

The Japanese retreat in BURMA has shown up one characteristic trait of the Japanese: their liability to depression in reverses. Although some PsW are imbued with the 'do or die' spirit several others have confessed to the low morale in their units and have said that the officers also have lost heart and could not control the men. The lack of news from the outside world was mentioned as a contributory factor to the men's discouragement. Given continued Allied successes this tendency to depression seems bound to increase and produce a favorable terrain for our propaganda.

In this respect the recent experiences of the Americans in LEYTE are interesting. The propaganda was particularly aimed at areas where the enemy was demoralized through heavy losses and also through hunger, which is a very powerful surrender motive with the Japanese. Leaflets pointing out the hopelessness of the situation and promising good food and humane treatment reaped high returns. Despite the ban against leaflets the men hid them in their clothes in case they should decide to surrender. One PW in LEYTE went so far as to say that 70% of the soldiers would surrender if they knew they would not be killed by their captors. This fear of torture, with the subsidiary fear of ostracism, or worse, for themselves and families on return to JAPAN, is the strongest deterrent to surrender. Time and again PW interrogations reveal the PsW desire not to return to JAPAN after the war, and their anxiety that their families should not be notified of their capture. This fear of ostracism could, it has been suggested by one PW, be lessened by repeated assurances that Allied victory will bring sweeping changes in the Japanese social system and recent interrogations have shown that PsW envisage the possibility of returning to JAPAN if she is decisively beaten, in which case they think it will be safe to go back. One or two PsW only have been aware of the fact that after the Russo-Japanese War and the Nomonhan (Manchurian border) Incident, the PsW had been allowed to return to the army or to JAPAN. For obvious reasons the leaders do not wish this to become common knowledge.

If a direct appeal pays in the front line, the more effective approach in the rear would still appear to be the indirect one of the appeal to the love of home and family. Indeed the timing and pinpointing of leaflets is most essential if results are to be obtained, and the 'right leaflet in the right place' is the key to propaganda success.

PROPAGANDA THEME --- FEAR OF SICKNESS

In view of the use of the 'fear of sickness' theme by our recent propaganda it is interesting to see on what concrete evidence of medical conditions in the Japanese Army this propaganda is based.

UNCLASSIFIED

[redacted]

(over)

DECLASSIFIED

[redacted]

PSYCHOLOGY JAPAN (CONTD)

A diary entry as far back as April 1944 refers to the very high sickness rate and to the fact that more men die from disease than from enemy bullets. More recent reports mention the high incidence of malaria, the average rate for all troops in BURMA being from 30-40%, while for those at the front it rises as high as 80%. On active service amoebic dysentry is also a prevalent disease, with approximately 33% of the troops contracting it.

An officer of the Japanese Medical Services taken at MYITKYINA mentioned that 25 % of the deaths were from tetanus, owing to lack of serum. Diseases due to malnutration, such as beri-beri, are also prevalent, whilst as a result of living in damp bunkers there is also a large percentage of sufferers from rheumatism as well as from skin diseases.

Lack of food supplies to build up those weakened from sickness and lack of medical supplies have made it impossible to tackle the problem adequately. The fact that in BURMA grass was being used for bandages shows the acuteness of the shortage of absolute essentials. Moreover, when there is not enough to go round, the lion's share of whatever medicines there are, is reserved for officers and NCOs.

A fact already confirmed is that the sickness rate in ARAKAN recently reached such proportions that the sick were not allowed to go to the hospital because the Japanese strength was so depleted.

Another report, also from BURMA, tells of sick kept in the front line to pound unhulled rice and dying from sheer exhaustion.

The following entries from a diary taken at PINWE on 30 Nov 44, and which belonged to a 2d Lt, speak for themselves:-

8.8.44 KANBALU before first night. Stood to in MANIGON Village. Facilities for evacuating casualties quite inadequate. Hence many men are needlessly dying.

19.9.44 Signal sent to TAKE:

Original strength	180
In Hospital	94
Killed in action & died of illnesses	62
Miscellaneous	7
Present strength	17

18.10.44 Only been with Regt a month, but have lost weight and had malaria once. Many of the men have died, in this country where medical attention is so inadequate.

The Japanese military authorities are fully alive to this deplorable state of affairs. In a recently captured manual issued by the Imperial GHQ and summarising lessons learned in the withdrawal in NEW GUINEA the medical side was severely criticised. "Many patients die without anything being done to save their lives" was one complaint and the poor medical leadership was held partly responsible for it. Other contributory factors mentioned were lack of personnel, medicines and transport, which are also the reason for the poor hospital conditions. The increase of medical supplies to be carried by each man was recommended as "ammunition against the dreadful enemy, disease". The fact having been established that, though only few die from wounds, many die from disease, energetic counter measures must be taken and their application ensured as much by all military commanders as by the Medical Services.

DECLASSIFIED

[redacted]

Apart from the loss in men incurred by disease the deterioration in morale is another aspect of the problem. This side was revealed by the interrogation of a sergeant major PW who had been through the fighting in MYITKYINA. Though the men there realised that due to battle conditions it was unavoidable that sick men should be required to fight, still their morale was affected because a sick or wounded man has a greater fear of the enemy and loses the will to fight. Moreover the morale was affected by the inadequacy of the medical services. Another point which has a bearing on morale is the attitude adopted by the Army vis a vis the sick as opposed to the wounded. The latter will be praised even though a wound may be caused by negligence, whereas a man who gets sick is blamed for not taking care of himself, although it may not be his fault at all. This injustice causes much resentment.

There is more however -- and perhaps this is what affects morale above everything else -- in case of retreat Japanese sick and wounded are killed to keep them from falling into enemy hands. PsW relate gruesome stories of badly wounded men being given poison and light cases being told to fight or given hand grenades to commit suicide.

Small wonder then that the treatment received by PsW at L Allied hands strikes them as nothing short of miraculous. One interrogation report mentions how moved the PsW present were on one occasion when a PW, who was obviously in a dying condition, was put in hospital. In the Japanese Army the man would not have been given treatment and care would have been considered wasted on someone who was bound to die in any case. The difficulty of course resides in making the Japanese believe in the medical care and humane treatment they will receive if they surrender.

A few PsW were recently interrogated on a certain number of leaflets, amongst which the American one called "Captain McCray" (XJM/63) which, in the words of a Japanese captured in MYITKYINA, tells of the devoted care given to the Japanese sick and wounded by an American doctor. Shown this leaflet the PsW said that they believed and understood it as they had had actual experience of the facts given, but they would not have believed before. According to one PW: "All of the statements in this leaflet are true facts. I have found the English to be gentle people ever since I was handed over to them as a Prisoner of War in CALCUTTA. This is contrary to our earlier convictions.

However, a recent Japanese effort at counter propaganda may well be an indication that the Japanese are beginning to find our propaganda effective. On 25 Feb a broadcast for the Pacific Zone dealt with the American difficulties with Medical Services on IWO JIMA. An American PW was alleged to have admitted that the casualty list of the Landing Forces is mounting daily due to lack of medical treatment and accommodation.

BRIEFS

DESOLATION AT TAKAO

Jap note-book diary describes: "In the harbor (TAKAO) I saw four or five sunken transport ships, buildings destroyed, sugar warehouses with their roofs blown off and sugar burned by air raids. It was really a disastrous sight. I was surprised to hear that this damage had been caused by air raids at the time of the sea battle off FORMOSA. 12 of our airplanes also had been shot down."
ATIS, SWPA Bulletin #1760, 13 Feb 45) (CONFIDENTIAL)

(over)

UNCLASSIFIED

Japanese Booby-Trap Igniter

(From USAFFE Board Report Number 225, 26 Feb 45)

This report presents a preliminary description of an ingenious and what is believed to be previously unreported igniter device, recovered by elements of the Sixth Army incident to recent operations on LUZON, as published in G-2 Weekly Report, Hq Sixth Army, 7 February 1945.

The mechanism is housed in a corrugated greenish-black celluloid container 4 3/8" x 2 3/4" x 11". Three internal longitudinal tubes are formed by the corrugated shape of the body shaped like a cigar case. The firing mechanism is located in the center tube. Two paper cartridges packed with what appears to be a metallic salt incendiary mixture are found in the two outer tubes on either side of the firing mechanism.

Near the top of the plastic body is a transverse slot to accommodate a release trigger. A second slot running along the long axis of the body is cut in the body near the bottom. A match head is fixed to the inner face of the top.

The striker consists of a small wood piece coated with abrasive material. This is fixed to a spring-loaded hollow brass spindle running through the center tube in the body. Within the spindle is a cylindrical copper container. This container is closed at both ends and contains a small vial of acid. A thin wire secured to the upper end of the container runs through the container and is secured to the bottom of the body. A small stop screw passes through a hole in the lower end of the spindle and threads into the container. The head of this screw fits in longitudinal slot in the body.

The device can be used either as a booby trap or demolition device. For booby trap operation, a blade-shaped trigger is inserted through the transverse slot in the body between the striker and matchhead. The stop screw in the longitudinal slot when held back by a piece of wood inserted in the slot acts as a safety device. To set the trap, all that need be done is remove this screw. Then, when the trigger is pulled out, the striker and spindle fly onto the matchhead under the influence of the spring, igniting the flare mixture.

To use the igniter as a demolition device, the trigger is again inserted. The wood piece holding the stop screw in the longitudinal slot is removed, but the screw itself remains in place. A screwdriver or punch is inserted through the longitudinal slot forward of the stop screw and through a similar slot in the spindle. By striking the screwdriver a sharp blow the acid vial within the copper container is shattered. The trigger is then removed from a distance. As soon as the acid eats through the wire securing the container to the bottom of the body (the container is secured to the spindle by the stop screw), the striker flies onto the matchhead, igniting the device.

This mechanism appears to be designed for use as an ignition device for inflammable material. However, as an anti-personnel device it would probably cause fatal injury to anyone setting it off.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

[redacted]

JAPANESE BOOBY TRAP IGNITER

All troops are cautioned not to handle this device. It will very likely be found in warehouses among boxes or in gasoline or fuel oil dumps. Trip wires may be rigged to the trigger, or the trigger may be pulled out when the igniter is moved.

Qualified bomb disposal personnel only may neutralize the igniter by pushing a knife blade through the transverse slot. Then immersion of the device in water for several hours will dissolve the matchhead and soak the black powder ignition train. The only way to disassemble the mechanism is to cut off the top and bottom of the plastic body. This makes possible the removal of the flare filling and firing mechanism.

[redacted]

* * * * * *

[redacted]

Jap Suicide Mission A Failure

(From SWPA, ATIS, Interr Report No 650, 14 Mar 45)

A glimpse of the Jap preparations for their airborne attack on LEYTE airfields, on 6 & 7 Dec 1944 is provided by the interrogation of a Jap PW, KATO Masakiyo. This Jap soldier, a leading private, took off with his unit, an unidentified suicide squad, from CLARK FIELD, MANILA. The plane was shot down over LEYTE and Leading Private KATO was fished out of SAN PEDRO Bay by American sailors.

While with MANSHU 58 Force, prisoner volunteered for unspecified duty in a suicide squad. As far as PW knew, all personnel of the squad were volunteers from different units in MANCHURIA, CHINA and JAPAN, each unit supplying one man. Various branches of service were represented but men from engineer units predominated. Two men from transport units received one day instruction in demolition at SAN FERNANDO. Prisoner did not know why one man only from each unit was chosen.

Commanding Officers of the companies called for volunteers and 11 men responded, including prisoner. Warrant Officer NASAII, Kenji chose (sic) prisoner not because of his merits as a soldier, but because the warrant officer disliked him.

Prisoner left FUSAN for UJIN, 27 Oct 44 with 20 such volunteers. On arrival at UJINA, 30 other volunteers drawn from units in JAPAN joined them. Prisoner had heard of no other suicide squads. He knew of no name designating the squad, nor did he know from where orders were issued, other than that on arrival at MANILA squad reported at 4 Air Army headquarters where, he presumed, instructions were given to the commanding officer of the squad, who later gave the orders to travel by train to SAN FERNANDO.

[redacted]

(over)

UNCLASSIFIED

The CO was a captain. There were two 1st Lieutenants, a total of 25 warrant officers, sergeants, and corporals, and 20 leading privates. Prisoner did not know names of officers.

On the 6th of Dec 44, at 1430 hours, prisoner and 10 others with Warrant Officer NAGAI in charge, boarded a SALLY at CLARK Field. The bomber crew comprised pilot, co-pilot and wireless operator. Accompanying airplanes were one similar type bomber and two Douglas type transports. Prisoner thought the commanding officer and the two 1st lieutenants were in the transport airplanes. Commanding officer had previously designated leaders of parties aboard airplanes and had instructed them as to their objectives.

NAGAI relayed the instructions to the prisoner's group after airplane took off. Their objective was to land on TACLOBAN Airfield, about three and one-half hours distant. The airplane crew was to destroy their airplane after the squad landed. Five men were to go direct to the fuel depot, blow it up and return to destroy engines of as many airplanes as possible. The rest of the party was divided into twos and threes and was instructed to disperse after landing and immediately begin blowing up airplane engines with picric acid charges. Warrant Officer NAGAI showed them a Japanese air photo of TACLOBAN Airfield with the fuel dump pinpointed.

In the prisoner's party two men carried light machine guns with 200 rounds of ammunition, and the rest carried Meiji 38 rifles with 40 rounds of ammunition. Each man carried three to five hand grenades and each man, including three members of bomber crew, carried several blocks of picric acid with fuzes and matches.

At about 1800 hours, when only two minutes flight from objective flying at 20 meters, the prisoner's bomber was shot down into the sea by ship's antiaircraft fire. While in the water, PW noticed the other bomber burning in the sea. He presumed that the two transports returned to CLARK Field.

If the mission had been successful, the party was to have assembled, appropriated an Allied motorboat and attempted to contact Japanese forces farther north. Men had been instructed in motorboat engines at MANILA.

BRIEFS

CANNIBALISM AGAIN.

Taken at AITAPE were handwritten letters to Capt MORIMOTO, CO of MINATO GAWA Sector Unit from Maj FUCHIGAMI, AOTSU Det Hq, and from Capt OHASHI, one of which stated, "Personnel of 238 Inf Regt were punished for eating human flesh."
(SWPA, ATIS Bulletin No 1848, 1 Mar 45) (CONFIDENTIAL)

UNCLASSIFIED

[redacted]

UNCLASSIFIED

First Independent Incendiary Company

(From SWPA, ATIS Interrogation Report No 667, 22 Mar 45)

Another look at the Jap paratroop and airborne attack on LEYTE Airfields (see "Jap Suicide Mission A Failure" - Page 23) 6 & 7 Dec 44, is given by the interrogation of 1st Lt SAKURA, Yoshio, who participated in the attack. During the night of 6 Dec 44, SAKURA's plane crashed into the sea just before reaching LEYTE (cause of crash unknown). He knew nothing further until the following day when he found himself still floating with the aid of his lifebelt and was taken prisoner by natives in a canoe, and handed over to American troops.

On 31 Oct 44, the commanding officer of Western 18 Force at KAGOSHIMA asked SAKURA if he would volunteer for unspecified duty with the Air Forces in the PHILIPPINES. PW (SAKURA) thought his commanding officer had not known it was a suicide unit, but even if he had stated it was, prisoner being a Japanese soldier, could not refuse to go. On 2 Nov 44, he left by air from NYUTABARA Airfield, MIYAZAKI, and on 5 Nov 44 reported to the PHILIPPINES Army Air Headquarters in MANILA. He was taken by Maj USHIDA to a large private house at SAN FERNANDO. There were 50 infantrymen, comprising five sergeant majors, 10 sergeants and 35 superior privates, who had been gathered there from various units in the PHILIPPINES about 1 Nov 44. Next day, Capt KATAGIRI, Yoshibumi arrived. He told the PW that he and his 50 men were 1 platoon of 1 Independent Company and that there were three other platoons. Prisoner was not told where these units were nor the names of their officers, except that of 1st Lt KONISHI.

In preparation for the mission, the platoon did regular infantry training until 27 Nov, when Capt KATAGIRI informed PW that he (the prisoner) would lead an attack on an airfield, and selected five sergeant majors, five sergeants and 19 superior privates for the mission. KATAGIRI also told him that the official designation of the company was 1 Independent Incendiary Company.

On 1 Dec 44, KATAGIRI gave PW an aerial photograph of TACLOBAN Airfield, and told him that they would not return from the mission. PW announced this to the men.

Capt KATAGIRI brought 10 captured American sub-machine guns, 1200 rounds of ammunition and 150 kg of picric acid. He instructed each man to break his 5 kg of picric acid blocks into 10 pieces, and showed them how to insert fuzes about three inches long, and detonators. They were to destroy all Allied airplanes on TACLOBAN Airfield by placing blocks of picric acid on top of the wings and horizontal stabilizer where they joined the fuselage. They were to move in groups of three, one with a sub-machine gun and 120 rounds, and each of the others with a Meiji 38 rifle and 60 rounds. In addition, every man carried five grenades and his picric acid. PW also carried 10 blocks of picric acid in addition to his pistol and sword.

[redacted]

(over)

UNCLASSIFIED

FIRST INDEPENDENT INCENDIARY COMPANY (CONTD)

At about 1200 hours on 6 Dec 44, PW and 29 men left SAN FERNANDO arriving at about 1230 hours at an airfield, which the pilot, Sgt-Maj TOKUYAMA, told him was one of the CLARK airfields. There he met Capt KATAGIRI, who told him that Lt Gen TOMINAGO, Kyoji, commanding general of the Japanese Army Air Force in the PHILIPPINES, had telephoned a message asking him to make a great effort.

They exchanged cups of wine, and PW's group entered three TOPSY's, 10 men per airplane. (NOTE:- PW identified these airplanes from photographs, but insisted that they had no windows.)

The pilots were all sergeant majors. There were no co-pilots or wireless operators.

The pilot told PW that the instructions were to destroy the airplanes as soon as they had landed on TACLOBAN Airfield. They left at 1300 hours and expected to reach TACLOBAN after dark. PW's airplane was shot down before reaching TACLOBAN and he did not know the fate of the other two airplanes.

PW consistently denied all knowledge of any parachute or other attack on TACLOBAN Airfield about the same time as his. He also denied all knowledge of any other incendiary or raiding formation.

BRIEFS

JAP EXTRALEGAL PUNISHMENT

Among other methods by which one Jap soldier is not supposed to admonish another of inferior rank is specifically listed the following:- "Assault (with fists, overshoes, belts, cleaning rods, tent poles, tent pegs, dispensary broom sticks, bamboo swords, or wooden rifles). (Document titled "Extralegal Punishment", captured UAFFIN Area.) SWPA, ATIS Enemy Publication No 336, 25 Mar 45) (CONFIDENTIAL)

UNCLASSIFIED

[redacted]

UNCLASSIFIED

Undercover Liaison

(From Annex to SAIPAN Garrison Force Periodic Intel Digest, 29 Mar 45)

Interception of an unusual exchange of notes between Jap prisoners interned in the PW Stockade on SAIPAN and Japanese still hiding in the hills was effected, and notes between 19-24 Feb 45 were recovered and translated.

The PWs were able to make contact with Japanese in the hills through notes left in a predetermined spot in the area above Headquarters Company where several of their number were working. Japanese in the hills came down at night, picked up the notes and left an answer in return. The hiding place was discovered and the notes intercepted. Translation of the complete file of notes is not given here. No intelligence of exceptional value was revealed other than an apparent desire on the part of the prisoners to induce the others also to give themselves up. The unsolicited nature of this action, of course, lends significance, though a degree of inconsistency is evident throughout the correspondence.

The following note was picked up from PW on 21 Feb 45. It was written by the PW to his friends in the hills:-

"I am sure your brave stand will not end in vain. Please have patience for the day to come.

"Foods will be supplied to you by us.

From,

A SOLDIER"

The following note was picked up on 21 Feb 45. It was written by one of the PWs (Masaji Inouye) who works in the Hq Co area to his friends still hiding in the mountains:

"All of you who are in the mountains at present: The fact that you have been coming down to the rubbish pile every night has been discovered. Although I cannot bear to face you, due to circumstances, I must write to you. At present there is an emergency in JAPAN, and the battle situation is very serious. For you to resist any longer will only cause injury to your health and result in sickness. For this reason, it is difficult to make plans. If I speak you will probably think me a spy. These are facts which I relate to you in embarrassment and shame. Our desire is that you come down from the mountains to this stockade as soon as possible; trust the kindness of the American soldiers and our guards. If you will come down from the mountains unarmed, there will be no bloodshed. From my experience up to now in the stockade, I can assure you that you will be treated right. I would even sacrifice my own life that you might be able to join us quickly. Undoubtedly you too will be surprised and happy at its atmosphere, I am pleading with you considering your future.

"The appointed time and place are as follows:

1. Time: Day after tomorrow (23d) 0900.
2. Place: The same rubbish pile.
3. Don't bring any arms (follow these instructions to the letter).
4. I desire all of you to come down from the mountains.
5. I assure you that you will not be fired upon.
   I WILL STAKE MY LIFE UPON THE ABOVE.

[redacted]

UNCLASSIFIED

(over)

UNCLASSIFIED

"If you violate the above instructions something will surely happen to you. Please consider our feelings and realize the present war situation. Our desire is that you come down from the mountains.

Members of the rubbish pile group.
Author - Inouye Masaji."

Jap Artillery Tactics In The Defense of Iwo Jima

One of the outstanding features of the defense of IWO JIMA, every phase of which was conducted with unusual skill and typical Jap tenacity, was the unprecedented effectiveness with which artillery was employed.

On D-day the following artillery and mortar units were on IWO JIMA:

2d Mixed Brigade Artillery Unit (3 firing Batteries)
145th Infantry Regiment Artillery Unit (4 Firing Batteries)
2d Medium Mortar Battalion (3 or 4 Mortar Companies)
3d Medium Mortar Battalion (3 Mortar Companies)
20th Independent Artillery Mortar Battalion (3 or 4 Mortar Comapanies)

In addition to the above artillery and mortar units, there were 3 Rocket Units on the island which may have been 3 companies of a Rocket Battalion. The exact strength and number of weapons of these units is not known. Two of the rocket units were attached to mortar battalions.

A list of the approximate number and caliber of weapons of the above listed organizations follows:

Artillery:

18 - 75mm Field Guns
5 - 75mm Mountain Howitzers
10 - 12cm Howitzers

(No information concerning these 12cm Howitzers is available. All reports agree that the caliber is 12cm and it is possible that this is the Model 38 (1905) 12 cm Howitzer, an obsolete weapon which is known to have been in use in CHINA a few years ago.)

--- continued next page ---

BRIEFS

TEN-MINUTE BREAK

HONG KONG-KOWLOON Area:- A party of guerrillas, stated to be on their way to blow up the telephone exchange located in NATHAN Road, encountered a party of Military Police (KEMPEI) on the TAIPO Road, and killed five of them. (S.E.A.T.I.C. Interrogation Bulletin No 19, 2 Feb 45) (CONFIDENTIAL)

UNCLASSIFIED